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JPRS 83909

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS

TANZANIA

ZAIRE

ZAMBIA

CONTINUITY OF FRANCO-AFRICAN RELATIONS REVIEWED

London WEST AFRICA in English 27 Jun 83 pp 1499-1501

Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text]

AFRICA REMAINED the only major geographical region where France was able in 1982 to chalk up a trade balance surplus. France's total balance of trade deficit last year reached an alarming FF103.9bn. its seventh deficit in the past ten years. Africa was the unique bright spot in the overall dismal performance of French trade. However, compared to past years Paris' surplus in Franco-African trade was significantly reduced: FF2.5bn. in 1982, against FF23.3bn. the previous year.

The principal reason for this poor French performance was the severe retrenchment in its exports to African markets. From FF75.2bn. in 1981, this figure dropped to FF61.4bn., a decline of 22.4 per cent. French imports from Africa, on the other hand, progressed to FF58.9bn., up 13.4 per cent on 1981's FF51.9bn. The economic difficulties affecting many African states were mainly responsible for the slackening demand of goods and services "Made in France".

With the exception of Nigeria, the top importers of French products are in North Africa, with Algeria leading the pack Likewise, the principal source of French imports comes from North African states. The francophone states are usually in the second tier of French commercial partners on the continent.

Nonetheless from a structural point of view, the African countries in the Franc zone continue to be a precious "captive market" for the beleaguered French economy. France's trade surplus with the Franc zone in 1982 was a handsome FF10.8bn., and it was only because of this strong position that France managed to maintain its commercial surplus with Africa. At FF22.9bn. last year, exports to the Franc zone composed 38.8 per cent of all French sales to Africa. French imports from the CFA zone in 1982 reached FF12.1bn., a total equal to 20.5 per cent of its purchases from Africa.

If France's commercial predominance in its former colonies has been trimmed back since independence, most of the francophone states still import between 40 and 60 per cent of their goods and services from the ex-metropole. The three devaluations of the French franc since President François Mitterrand came to office in May 1981, and consequently the depreciation of the CFA franc's value, serve to reinforce France's economic hegemony in the zone as the cost of goods and services from other countries are artificially boosted.

This automatic alignment of the CFA franc on its big French brother, if it guarantees convertibility, does have a series of marked negative effects. For example, the Franc zone states have little say in the fixing of the parity of their currency. In general, the devaluation of the CFA franc cannot act as a spur to exports for most African tropical products have inelastic demand profiles in relationship to price. Factors on the world market, more than a softer CFA franc, are determinant in the export of tropical produce like coffee, cocoa, rubber and

groundnuts. Yet another negative factor of the three devaluations of the past twenty months for Franc zone members is the fact that about half their foreign debt is denominated in US dollars, and this makes repayment more arduous.

The devaluation of the CFA franc also exacerbates inequalities in the zone. The richer coastal countries such as Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon and Ivory Coast, with oil and mineral exports denominated in US dollars automatically benefit from the increase in the American currency's parity with the franc. On the other hand the poorer hinterland states like Upper Volta, Senegal, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Niger suffer because they are obliged to pay more for their import of crude oil and other non-French manufactured durables and container goods.

The semi-official weekly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, *le Moniteur du Commerce Extérieur* (MOCI), touched off a controversy last year when it wrote that France's markets in Africa were of "the colonial type" with raw materials being exchanged for manufactured goods. The publication also noted that "it would be dangerous if a quarter of French export of industrial goods continued to be concentrated on a continent which is economically behind the rest of the third world." Yet Africa, particularly French-speaking Africa, offers an outlet, still largely protected in comparison with the cut throat competition in the Middle East or South-East Asia, which is vital for France's industries. MOCI made no secret of the fact that in a time of deepening economic crisis "this faithful clientele, which France seems to have assured for quite some time to come in Africa, is an advantage which must be preserved."

Even if French exports to Africa usually average around 12-13 per cent of its total sales abroad, their importance is capital in strategic industries. Thus in 1981, 20 per cent of French mechanical industry sales abroad were in Africa, as were 13 per cent of steel sales and 36 per cent for the pharmaceutical industry.

On the other side of the coin, Africa provides France with a substantial portion of its raw materials. In 1982, 18.4 per cent of Paris' imports of crude oil came from African producers, up from 13 per cent the previous year. All of France's uranium imports come from Niger, Gabon and probably Namibia too. Over 20 per cent of iron ore needs originate in Mauritania and Liberia. A third of copper imports come from Zambia and Zaire, while Gabon supplies almost half France's manganese requirements. Phosphate producers like Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal and Togo account for around a third of French purchases abroad.

Beneficial terms

In this manufactured goods for raw material trade nexus, France, like the other industrialised states, largely benefits from the deterioration of the terms of trade which bedevil third world natural resource producers. It is only for political reasons that the Mitterrand administration, in spite of its official rhetoric favourable to the third world, grants special arrangements to African primary product exporters. For instance, a preferential arrangement was hammered out after almost a year of tough negotiations whereby France is paying about 15 per cent more than the going world price for Algerian liquefied natural gas (LNG). In return, however, the Algerians have agreed to augment their purchase of French goods. A price about 40 per cent superior to the world market has been accorded Niger for its uranium. In many ways, this deal is a disguised form of aid which props by the Kountché government in this strategically situated Sahel country.

Africa also represents a prime zone of action for major French multinationals. The state-controlled hydrocarbon group, Elf Aquitaine, was created in the 1960s to be France's oil arm in Africa and last year 88.8 per cent of its total oil output came from the six African states where it has operations. This company plays the oil game like the other major oil groups and is at present resisting Congo's demand for higher tax levies and Gabon's desire to boost its equity in Elf-Gabon. Large trading houses like *Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale* (CFAO) and *Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain* (SCOA) have founded their prosperity on the inequalities characterising Franco-African trade. The private French airline, *Union des Transports Aérien* (UTA), has its most profitable operations in Africa.

The presence of French capital and French nationals in Africa is also a lucrative source of financial transfers which help bail out the hard-pressed French balance of payments. As at January 1, 1982, 311,800 Frenchmen were officially residing in Afri-

ca (a figure probably below the real level), with Ivory Coast, Algeria, Morocco, Gabon and Senegal heading the list (see table 3). Thus vis-à-vis tiny Gabon in 1980 (and the situation has hardly changed since), the transfer of salaries by Frenchmen in the country was CFA26.7bn., the profit repatriated by French firms totalled CFA67.8bn., the debt service paid French banks reached CFA30.5bn., for a global sum of CFA125bn. New French capital invested in Gabon in 1980 was a meagre CFA4.7bn. and French aid a parsimonious CFA6.3bn. Therefore, the financial flow favourable to France was a hefty CFA114bn. The story is largely the same in the other prosperous francophone states like Ivory Coast, Congo and increasingly Cameroon.

In his 16 months in office as Minister of Co-operation and Development, Jean-Pierre Cot looked for ways to change the relationship, while seeking to impress the view that increased aid to Africa and the Third World was in France's advantage as its broadened business opportunities, but French corporations are firmly rooted in their old ways and hardly appreciated Cot's efforts. Cot, for instance, was firmly opposed to French financial assistance for a FF500m. medical centre near President Bongo's home town of Franceville. The Gabonese head of state sought a FF180m. suppliers credit from Paris and wrote to President Mitterrand that he was surprised that Cot should be "in total disagreement with the interests of French companies."

By the same token, Cot firmly opposed French government assistance for the construction of a colour television network in Burundi, one of the poorest nations in Africa. But as French electronics industry had sewed up the deal, President Mitterrand gave the green light when he visited Bujumbura late last year. This widening gap between immediate French financial interests and longer term goals was aptly summed up by Philippe Hugon, an economist close to the French Socialist Party, when he wrote in a report on Franco-African relations: "A new Franco-African policy of co-operation cannot escape the contradiction between a low rate of return, at least in the short-to-medium run, of development projects corresponding to the bettering in the living conditions of the majority of the population and the possibility of commercial projects which provide a fillip for French enterprises."

A recent report commissioned by the Ministry of Co-operation and Development, written under the direction of Yves Berthelot and Jacques de Bandt, underscored the advantages France could garner from boosting its aid to Africa and the Third World. In the documentary evidence supporting their views, Berthelot and De Bandt show that on the average in the 1975-1980 period between 50 and 70 per cent of French technical and cultural assistance came back to France through purchases of French goods or the transfer of salaries of *coopérants*, a figure which rose to between 70 and 80 per cent for aid from the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (CCCE) and 100 per cent for French Treasury financial operations.

One of Cot's pet projects was to boost French aid as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) to 0.75 per cent. Officially in 1983, it is supposed to rise to 0.45 per cent, in comparison with 0.40 per cent in 1982 and 0.34 per cent in 1981. As attractive as this augmentation may seem, it clearly marks the limitations of France's "New Deal" with Africa and the Third World. In no way was the new French policy, even before the recent retrenchment with the bowing out of the scene but Cot and his replacement by Christian Nucci, designed to come to grips with the structural causes of underdevelopment or the flagrant inequalities of Franco-African trade.

In the past 20 years or more France has had Third World-orientated policy objectives, which while presenting France as a unique friend of developing countries, has also helped edge competitors out of contracts.

If France has succeeded in this in many non-Francophone countries, the most remarkable inroads being in the Nigerian market, it must face the onslaught of other western states in its only Francophone sphere of influence. In these states the roles are diametrically reversed. Such industrial powers as the United States, Japan, West Germany and a newcomer like Brazil are often able to play on antagonisms between France and the ruling elite in Francophone Africa. In Gabon, for example, Elf pared down its investment in the late 1970s and the result was that this country's oil reserves dipped to an alarmingly low level. President Omar Bongo countered by granting an exploration permit, previously abandoned by Elf, to Stan-

dard Oil of Indiana (Amoco). The American company quickly found oil and should produce by the end of this year 20,000 barrels per day (b/d) from the offshore block. Elf, tardily, was obliged to step up exploration-development spending in the face of this US success.

The same story holds true in the Ivory Coast's nascent oil industry. It was on a block abandoned by Elf that Phillips Petroleum of the US has uncovered the Espoir deposit. In Mauritania, a coalition of young nationalist army officers and radical technocrats tipped the balance in the competition for the $250 million-plus trans-Mauritania highway scheme in favour of Brazil's Mendes International, much to the chagrin of France's Colas. The objective of this move was to diversify away from France, Mauritania's economic partners. Likewise, Japanese motor vehicle manufacturers have been able to register a remarkable breakthrough in Francophone Africa in the last five years by providing more sturdy and reliable vehicles than French producers like Renault and Peugeot and, more importantly, at highly competitive prices.

The latest sign that France's much-heralded new approach to Africa and the Third World has started to flounder was the axing in March of the Inter-Ministerial Delegation for Co-operation and Development Aid, headed by the diplomat Stéphane Hessel. Created in December, 1981, to bring a greater degree of coherence to French development programmes and iron out bureaucratic infighting among the different ministries with a stake in "development business", this inter-ministerial delegation finally fell victim to the influence of entrenched interests. As Hessel recently wrote with a touch of bitterness: "It is only possible to firmly express the hope that measures will be taken to avoid that we again fall into the pitfalls of clientelism and improvisation in our development aid policies."

CSO: 3400/1593

CHANGES IN RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY HERALDED

London WEST AFRICA in English 30 May 83 pp 1282-83

[Article by Veronica Forrester]

[Text]

THE WEST German government intends to provide greater support to the middle-income countries in Africa. This is one of the main changes resulting from the formation of the new Christian Democrat/Liberal coalition.

In an interview with *West Africa*, Dr. Volkmar Köhler (CDU), minister of state in the ministry of economic co-operation, argued that support must be given to countries which at least stand a chance of economic take-off. The weakness of policy under the previous government had, he argued, been over-concentrated on the least developed states. While humanitarian assistance will be unaffected by new policy guidelines, thought must now be given to where development can be achieved. That such a policy would widen the gap between the least-developed and the "richer" African states was, he said, unavoidable.

Couched in heavy ideological terms, the government states its intention to support countries having pluralistic structures, following market-economy policies and striving to achieve social reform, while at the same time being supporters of the western alliance (now re-defined as those which are truly non-aligned).

These guidelines have been heavily criticised by the social democratic opposition party, SPD, which accuses the new government of bringing the East-West conflict into North-South relations and returning to the Cold War era of the fifties. This criticism is countered by government officials who maintain that countries having friendly relations with Moscow and East Germany cannot expect to be counted among the nations friendly to West Germany.

Particularly controversial, is future policy towards southern Africa. Presenting his government's programme to parliament on May 4, Chancellor Helmut Köhl merely stated that the German government, with its western partners, is working towards the speedy independence of Namibia. A joint working document of the two conservative parties CDU/CSU is however more specific. Although not government policy this paper is nevertheless indicative of thinking particularly within the conservative CSU. On Namibia, it advocates full support for the approach of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA); the immediate cessation of support for the "pro-communist" and "terrorist" SWAPO, and "appropriate influence" on the EEC. It also argues for "detachment" from UN Resolution 435 which cannot be implemented as long as Cuban soldiers are in Angola, and closes by adding that the German consulate in Windhoek should be

re-opened. This document, which also states that white culture in South Africa must remain intact, was reportedly drafted by the Bavarian CSU party and later adopted by the Christian Democratic CDU.

In a subsequent debate in parliament, Dr. Ehmke (SPD) asked for clarity on government policy toward southern Africa. Referring at length to the "joint CDU/CSU document", Dr. Ehmke said that the section on South Africa and Namibia could have been written by the South African propaganda department. What, he asked, is government policy — the vague generalities contained in the government programme presented on May 4, or the concrete views contained in the working document which the CSU colleagues had presented as agreed CDU/CSU policy. In reply, Herr Ruhe (CDU/CSU) stated that agreed policy is contained in the government programme.

In an interview published in the magazine *Spiegel*, CDU General Secretary, Heiner Geissler, was forced to admit that he and his CSU counterpart, Edmund Stoiber, had failed to agree on the policy guidelines presented in this working document. Herr Geissler added: "There are more important things than a joint paper on Africa". Actions speak louder than words. During the parliamentary debate on the government programme, Foreign Minister Genscher curiously enough made no reference to policy on Africa.

The Bavarian CSU, led by Franz Joseph Strauss is well known for its right wing view. Whatever his intentions may be, the fact remains that future policy on Africa has to win the support of the liberal FDP, and with it that of foreign minister Genscher.

The centre-right coalition government of CDU/CSU and FDP has effectively been in office since last October. The collapse of the previous social democratic/liberal coalition under Helmut Schmidt, led to the formation of the new coalition. On March 6, the West German electorate supported this move and returned the centre-right coalition to power.

Soon after their election last autumn, the new government announced sweeping cuts in development aid. Although the overall budget for the ministry of economic co-operation was increased by 3.9 per cent to DM6,263m. in 1983, new aid commitments are being reduced by 27.6 per cent. This is because payments due on agreements made in earlier years exceed the funds available. The previous government had, according to the Christian Democrats, assumed that the aid budget would be increased by 10 per cent per year, whereas in practice it had increased by about 4 per cent. As a result, outstanding commitments total DM27,000m. By cutting new aid allocations in 1983 and 1984, the government hopes to have the ministry's books back in order by 1985.

Controversy has also surrounded the list of countries scheduled to receive cuts in aid. Government officials state that the countries selected still have projects in the pipeline. The opposition SPD however state that of the 26 countries scheduled for cuts, nine are among those considered politically "suspect" by the new government. In the case of Africa these include, according to the SPD, Mali (aid reduction DM5m.), Mozambique (DM15m.), Zimbabwe (DM10m.), Benin (20m.). The SPD are also critical that ten least-developed countries are scheduled for aid cuts, Benin, Burundi, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda and Sudan.

Regarding the selection of projects, the new German government has indicated that preference will be given to those which result in contracts for German firms. The Ivory Coast has already been promised an additional credit of DM45m. if German firms win contracts connected with the Soubré hydro-electric scheme. With unemployment currently at 2.3 million, the West German government is also thinking of ways of boosting job opportunities.

African raw materials

The Bonn government is also keen to encourage private investment in the Third World as a means of complementing official development assistance. Various incentives are already offered to German firms establishing joint ventures abroad and the present government is considering further ways of stimulating private business.

Africa is of considerable importance to West Germany when it comes to the supply of raw materials. For example, in 1981 32

per cent of German oil was imported from Africa, also 70 per cent of manganese, 64 per cent of chrome, 57 per cent of uranium, and 49 per cent of bauxite. About 94 per cent of German imports of tropical wood come from Africa and over 78 per cent of cocoa.

In 1982, German imports from Africa totalled DM22,117m. and exports DM17,957m. — roughly the same as German trade with the state-trading countries. These few figures indicate the economic importance attached to relations with Africa and hence German interest in promoting economic relations.

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OAU VIEWED AS 'TOKEN PAN-CONTINENTAL RITUAL'

London WEST AFRICA in English 23 May 83 pp 1225-27

[Article by S.K.B. Asante]

[Text]

ON MAY 25 this year, the Organisation of African Unity, the world's largest continental organisation and the first tangible fruit of the dream of Pan-African unity, celebrates its 20th anniversary. The member states of the Organisation may not, however, be inclined to readily reaffirm their faith in the OAU Charter as has usually been the case on this auspicious African Liberation Day. For the OAU is no longer held in such high esteem by the African Heads of State as it was during the first decade of its existence. The Organisation would seem to have registered all its positive accomplishments by the end of its first decade. For example, the OAU was able, at least, to take a firm stand for a solution that preserved the integrity of Nigeria during the Civil War. This made it impossible for any big power to side effectively with Biafra. It was during this period also that OAU sometimes provided a basis for the peaceful settlement of disputes, particularly border conflicts, among its members. The relative successes constituted an example of effective action taken by an international organisation to safeguard regional peace and security.

Now, however, the OAU has become increasingly a laughing-stock, a butt for cheap ridicule and indeed, Africa's first instalment of Utopia. The "spirit of Addis Ababa", which had been the source of OAU's strength and vitality in the past, would seem to have evaporated into thin air. And the Organisation has continued to exhibit signs of decline in the face of challenges confronting it. Many African leaders do not really regard the OAU as a serious forum any more; it is, rather, a place to display their might by disrupting conferences with frequent and meaningless walkouts. The recent Tripoli (1 and 2) fiasco could as well mark the beginning of the Organisation's long-predicted demise. Briefly stated, then, the OAU is now no more than a token pan-continental ritual.

Perhaps the most crucial political challenge which has confronted the OAU in the last ten years is the dominant question of foreign intervention. Since the ignominous Angolan civil war, Africa has lurched from crisis to crisis and the continent has gradually become the focus of global politics. Foreign intervention, military and otherwise, has become an increasingly important factor in political developments in Africa. All the major Powers, as well as some of the smaller ones, have been drawn more deeply into the affairs of the continent. Perhaps at no time in the continent's history since the end of the 19th-century has Africa been embroiled in military confrontations on a scale comparable to the period immediately following the Angolan civil war. And, as has been in the past, the extra dimension has always been the ease with which foreign powers have taken Africa to be their Armageddon. Thus the 1884 Berlin Conference is being re-enacted in a 20th-century setting, in Zaire, Chad, Western Sahara, the Ogaden and Eritrea.

On the other hand, the OAU is firmly opposed to any external interference in the

continent's internal conflicts. This commitment under the Charter was reinforced at the 1965 Accra summit where members agreed not to tolerate subversive activity directed from outside Africa against any member state. As if this was not enough, they were unequivocal in their determination 'to oppose collectively and firmly by any means at the disposal of Africa every form of subversion conceived, organised or financed by foreign powers against Africa, the OAU, or against its members individually! But despite this clear-cut policy statement on the issue of external military intervention, the OAU has not had much success in preventing "foreign meddling".

The OAU has been meeting this challenge of foreign intervention with a divided mind, and with no apparent result. Despite the attendance at Libreville July 1977 OAU summit of as many as 23 Heads of State and Government, the meeting showed few signs of "African Unity". No real effort was made to implement the Organisation's policy of resisting foreign intervention in essentially African disputes.

But it was at the subsequent summit at Khartoum in July 1978 that the African leaders, for the first time, seriously faced up to the challenge of foreign intervention in their affairs. The summit showed that the continent's leaders were no longer as confident of their ability to stop all foreign meddling in their affairs as they had been in the 1960s; nor was there any longer even consensus about whether or not all forms of external intervention were undesirable. The main disagreements at Khartoum were over which of the foreign powers were responsible for the threats to the continent's stability.

The best the OAU could offer at Khartoum was to reach a disturbing compromise on this crucial issue of foreign military intervention: the right of African states to appeal for help to countries of their choice. This in effect was an "unofficial" OAU invitation to foreign powers to intervene in the affairs of the continent. Thus those that the founding fathers of the OAU in 1963 sought to exclude from shaping Africa's destiny are now being invited to come back to Africa to exploit Africa's political divisions and economic weakness to their own advantage.

Even in its role as peacemaker in Africa, the OAU has witnessed in recent years a serious decline. It had very little to do with ending the civil war in Angola, which was terminated not by negotiation but by the forces of external intervention. For example, in 1976 at the OAU summit at Port Louis the display of disputes between OAU members and the vigour with which the disputing parties fought each other completely over-shadowed the crucial problems which faced the organisation — the then unresolved issue of minority rule in Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia. Morocco and Mauritania threatened to terminate their membership if the OAU continued to support Polisario; Uganda accused Kenya of complicity in the Israeli raid on Uganda's Entebbe airport; Ethiopia sought a firm stand by the OAU on what its delegation described as "expansionist plans of Somalia on the territory of the Afars and Issas"; President Numieiri of Sudan accused Libya of plotting a coup d'etat in Sudan to overthrow him.

More disturbing is the fact that the OAU has not been in a position to prevent any of the disputes breaking out into war. This has been clearly shown by the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Sudan along their borders in April 1977. Although both countries filed their complaints with the OAU the only thing the organisation could do was to register them. Even less was done about the conflict in the Zaire province of Shaba, despite the direct involvement of outside powers. And in recent years, the vexed issues of Chad and Western Sahara have effectively exposed the virtual impotence of the OAU, and the future of the Organisation is being seriously threatened following the failure of the two Tripoli attempts (August and November 1982) to hold the 19th summit.

What, then, has gone wrong? Is it the fault of the OAU Charter? Have the African states really exhausted the untried resources and potentialities of the Charter? to what really can we attribute the present impotence of the OAU? Can it be justifiably attributed to the present type of political leadership in Africa?

The OAU Charter may not be perfect. But it is not the Charter that obstructs the way to peace and the course towards African unity. The Charter sets forth a few basic principles but leaves to the member states the responsibility of finding suitable means of carrying out those principles. The Charter is not a self-operating mechanism. Its operation depends not so much on the words of the Charter as on the way member states exercise their rights and meet their responsibilities. Some means are specified in the Charter, but these are

not necessarily exclusive. Within widest limits other means are not prohibited.

To a great extent, therefore, it is not the inadequacy or limitations of the OAU Charter which have caused the present political paralysis. The principles and objectives enshrined in the Charter still hold good. It is a matter of the spirit that needs to be changed — the attitudes of the member states towards the Organisation.

For in the case of international organisation in particular, what politicians have put together, politicians can rip asunder. The constraints on the activities of the OAU in recent years reflect the preferences — and fears — of the heads of state who collectively determine what the Organisation should not do, or try to do. The positive accomplishments registered by the OAU in the past have resulted primarily from the collective determination by the heads of state to resolve African issues in African ways. A constant leitmotif in both debates and activities is minimisation of extra-African impact on the continent.

This type of collective will or collective determination would seem to have eluded the OAU in recent years. For the Organisation has since the February 1976 extraordinary summit on the Angolan war split right in the centre. Following the division at that summit, two strands of opinion have begun to coagulate into two openly opposed blocs, arbitrarily described as "progressive" and "moderate". This division of the OAU has in recent months been intensified by Gaddafi's Libya. For, on the issue of admission of Chad to the last November Tripoli OAU Ministerial meeting, for example, the Libyans claimed the support of what they termed "radical" countries in their bid to seat the Goukhouni delegation, as opposed to that of Hissen Habré which was supported by the "moderates". Furthermore at the previous OAU attempted summit in Tripoli in August 1982, President Gaddafi actually mooted the idea of forming an alternative grouping of "radical states". While this division can not be neatly characterised in ideological terms, it is evidently clear that it is reminiscent of what was prevailing in the early years of the OAU when the Organisation comprised the radical Casablanca and moderate Brazzaville and Monrovia groups. It is these two opposing groups which seems to have resurrected. Thus today, as one scholar has recently commented, there is very little that one can lump together and call a common African position: there are two OAUs.

This division — and indeed the whole question about the current OAU's low profile in African affairs — seems to have been brought about by the type of political leadership emerging on the African scene. The "old boy" atmosphere of the first years of the OAU Assembly has diminished, of course, with the expansion of the membership and the passing from the scene of many of the founding fathers of African nationalism. In the earlier years, peer pressure could effect extraordinary reconciliations among those who shared a common history in the forging of nations out of European colonies. The statistics alone suggest that personal ties may be weakening as a cement for OAU actions. Of the 32 Heads of State and Government who were signatories to the OAU's Charter in May 1963, only four — Guinea, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Tunisia remain in office*. Most of them had been casualties of the spate of the coups d'etat that began with the overthrow of Togo's Sylvanus Olympio in January 1963.

Hence, today, many political leaders gained power through coups d'etat, reflecting the military's emergence as the key political actor in contemporary Africa. Thus at an historical moment when Africa is confronted with pressing problems, the OAU has, either by fate of design, handed over the stewardship of African affairs to leaders who either cannot marshall the support of all OAU member states or are least interested in affairs outside their respective countries. For while the military backgrounds of more than half of Africa's current presidents could provide a set of shared experiences and assumptions facilitating co-operation, the prime concern of most governments dominated by members of the military appears often to be the resolution of the domestic grievances that brought them to power rather than the kinds of foreign policy issues to which their civilian predecessors gave attention. Closely related to this is the attempt on the part of the military to perpetuate their misrule or phoney regimes by purchasing most expensive and highly sophisticated arms to both protect themselves and suppress the civilian population who daily cry in vain for the basic necessities of life.

To such leaders, the current Southern African imbroglio, the inter-state conflicts in other parts of the continent, the grave economic problems, and even foreign intervention appear to be of secondary consideration. Attendance at OAU summits at which such issues are discussed means little

to them, despite their rhetoric to the contrary. They are intensely pre-occupied with safeguarding their position against possible coups in their absence.

The trend towards military regimes in Africa — headed mostly by "low-cost-dictators" — has no doubt affected the quality and direction of continental international relations. Coups d'etat have upset not only inter-state relationships but also co-operative regional linkages and have often led to unstable governments for whom, as indicated above, foreign policy and the need to strengthen the OAU is subordinate to the need for political survival. Thus at 20, the OAU has come of age, the age of reason. But its respectable passage into manhood is being recklessly thwarted by the increasing incidence of military interventions, coups, counter coups, threat of coups and a new type of leadership which are diminishing commitment to pan-African goals.

Perhaps the time has come, therefore, to give the OAU "teeth" and to make it a positive instrument that can shape the destinies of the African peoples. The Organisation must be equipped in terms of mechanisms and organs to have a body which will have the power to react to conflict situations before they get out of hand. There is the need, also, to strengthen the powers of the Secretary-General; to completely overhaul the internal structure of the OAU Secretariat; and also to establish a supreme organ of the OAU to deal with the economic problems of Africa. Such reforms are necessary to enable the organisation to develop a greater capacity to enforce its authority over its member states in defence of its charter and to meet squarely the challenges of the 1980s.

*King Hassan of Morocco was absent from the summit and did not sign the charter until September 1963.

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GREATER STRESS ON REGIONAL ISSUES URGED

London WEST AFRICA in English 23 May 83 pp 1228-29

[Article by Sammy Kum Buo]

[Text] IN TODAY'S HIGHLY polarised world plagued by growing socio-economic, political and security crises and tensions within and between states, Black Africa, already the weakest link in the international chain, appears to be in a particularly difficult — and worsening — situation. The harsh evidence is visible in every sphere and everywhere in the region: from country to country, one is confronted by tattered economies, political fragility, lacklustre administrations, moral decay, social disequilibrium and a pervasive sense of insecurity and instability.

The net result of these negative trends is, at best, ironic. One finds an Africa blessed by immense natural wealth but continuing to wallow in massive poverty and underdevelopment; a land whose early crusade for freedom and independence envisaged, ultimately, the total unity of African peoples and territories, but that today lies prostrate in disunity and disharmony. Humbled and humiliated by the continuing manipulation and paternalism of its former colonial mentors, the diplomatic indifference of the United States, the limited and unsentimental assistance of the Soviet Union and China and the continuing decline, in influence, of the United Nations — where developing and other small countries could work together to make themselves heard and their power felt — Africa has been reduced to a toothless bulldog; A land which speaks loudly but carries a small stick; A land which barks but can't bite; A land which, because of its real poverty, must compromise its principles because, as the saying goes, "a beggar has no choice".

That unflattering picture of Black Africa's diplomatic position in the contemporary international system is worsened by the fact that the high moral credentials with which most African states entered the international community at independence have been replaced by the blood-curdling violence of coups, ethnic conflict and sheer political repression, that has marked and marred post-independent Africa. Such fratricidal violence, indubitably, hurts Africa's diplomatic credibility when it decries the brutality of the apartheid South African regime.

The common-man's view of diplomacy, in my small Cameroonian town of Wum, brings forth images of well-dressed and well-paid ambassadors living in mansions and being driven around in large black limousines to an endless string of elegant parties. From experience, that may indeed be a fairly typical viewpoint throughout Africa. Rarely does the common-man see diplomacy as hard work: it is, if anything, fun. It appears that that partial and misleading image of diplomacy is not limited to the common-man in the village but has also infested the elites responsible for planning and executing African diplomacy. The result is a diplomacy high on style and low on substance. Consequently, the region's vital interests are under-served, under-represented and undefended, thus facilitating and contributing to its collective disarray and vulnerability.

That stylish image of diplomacy among Africans is partly responsible for the customary practice of most African governments assigning higher priority in terms of

policies, resources, staff and "prestige" to their diplomatic representation with non-African countries, in particular former colonial powers. Thus most diplomats aim at serving in such cities as Paris, London, Brussels, Lisbon, New York, Washington D.C. or Bonn, even if at the practical substantive level they would have more important assignments to perform serving in a neighbouring African country. The result is that with most attention and resources devoted to extra-continental diplomacy, inter-African co-operation suffers, foreign manipulation of African policies increases and, ultimately, Africa's international position, lacking in cohesion, is weakened.

Kwame Nkrumah was the first and perhaps only African leader so far to recognise the critical importance of collective diplomacy in a continent of many small poor states. He understood that the attention he commanded on the world stage was due not only to his leadership of Ghana but more importantly to his unchallenged position at the time as the spokesman for African independence and unity. Under Nkrumah therefore, Ghana's Bureau of African Affairs, which was attached directly to the Office of the President, emerged as perhaps the most prestigious and influential department of government, except of course for the Office of the President itself.

Without in any way trying to ignore or to belittle realities which show Africa as highly dependent on such outside regions as North America and Europe for defence and development assistance, I believe that African governments should immediately begin to move towards placing primary and central diplomatic emphasis on regional issues. Such a strategy would, in the long-term, present more opportunities for Africa's economic recovery and diplomatic respect than the current approach which tends to perpetuate the dependency of the smaller and poorer African states on the bigger and richer great powers. In a world of power politics the strength of the weak is more likely to come from their collective rather than unilateral action.

Therefore, in my view, the highest priority for African diplomacy should be the commonalisation of interests and strategies. This would, in the first place, require of each African country, greater emphasis on African affairs, involving closer diplomatic contacts and co-ordination at the bilateral, sub-regional and wider levels. Far from finding such enhanced regional co-operation a threat, Africa's genuine foreign friends would more probably find that it simplifies matters by more readily identifying the African position or approach regarding regional as well as international issues.

Disparate and unco-ordinated diplomacy by individual African states, especially the smallest and poorest ones, has the effect mainly of unnecessarily overstretching and diffusing the limited authority, influence and resources of these states thinly over a wide area with minimal resultant impact. A number of West African states, among them Ghana and Sierra Leone, have recognised that the limited benefits of their far-flung diplomacy are not worth the heavy costs involved in badly needed foreign currency and as such they have proceeded to close down several of their diplomatic missions, even in such major countries as France and the Federal Republic of Germany, in the case of Sierra Leone.

An integrated and co-ordinated approach to African diplomacy, involving joint action by a combination of regional or sub-regional States would, on the other hand, be more likely to generate greater diplomatic impact. It is therefore significant, in this respect, that West Africa's Nigeria participates jointly with southern Africa's front-line states in the search for a diplomatic solution to the Namibia problem. Such common action enhances African credibility, strengthens the African position and puts maximum pressure on South Africa and the Western Contact Group engaged in the drawn-out Namibian negotiations.

The proposal for closer inter-African diplomacy is more than a sentimental contribution to the quest for the elusive goal of African unity. It is actually a realistic proposition based on the fact that major events occurring in one African country often have an impact on its neighbour. Moreover, in a world of bloc politics, the natural constituency of each African country is clearly with fellow African states. While non-alignment is relevant as a policy option in the light of the dominant ideological contests between East and West, African states should however be alert to the limitations and contradictions within that amorphous conglomeration of countries constituting the non-aligned movement.

The issues of world peace and development which now dominate the movement's activities are not the concerns of the group

alone, a group which is composed of richer and poorer members as well as members at war with each other. Although the African group of states is also rife with contradictions of one sort or the other, what binds the group together is stronger than what divides it and this is an adequately valid reason for African states to place the highest diplomatic priority on co-operation between and among themselves.

Next in importance to the question of the approach African states should follow in their diplomacy is the question of the issues they should emphasise in their diplomatic activities. Coming from the position that one should face the world the way it is and not the way one would like it to be, it would therefore appear to me that priority should be devoted to security and survival concerns. These are basic issues upon which other national activities are based and which determine, to a large extent, the prospects and potential of governments and their respective countries. Thus, an unstable state that must depend on outside supplies to feed its people is inherently vulnerable, and is likely to be judged by others as too risky for investment purposes and as ill-prepared for genuine self-reliance.

The prevalence of armed conflict and other security crises in Africa constitutes a serious impediment to efforts at national and regional integration and development and hurts Africa's image and credibility abroad. No country in the region is immune from such difficulties and only a concerted regional effort within well-defined operational parameters can produce reliable results. If, as it seems, the security of African states is inter-related, then so would their insecurity appear to be. For instance, the conflict in Chad has had and continues to have widespread ramifications in the neighbouring countries. Therefore, genuine peace in that country would require the co-operation of its neighbours, among others. At the wider regional level, my proposal (see *West Africa*, April 18), for a new regional arrangement to deal exclusively with security crises within or involving Black African states would appear to offer some opportunities for progress in this field.

Efforts to build regional security must proceed simultaneously with efforts at economic development, if such security is to be meaningful or lasting. And, in this field, priority should be given to agriculture. The alarming drop in food production in Africa is a serious threat to the welfare and survival of Africans and a big drain on already tiny foreign reserves. Yet this should not be so. Agriculture is a sound investment field. The same cannot be said for the precocious development of infant industries with little chance of competing effectively with the higher productivity and lower costs of the more advanced industrial economies. Of course industrialisation must be maintained as the ultimate goal. But it should be built on Africa's agricultural productivity, instead of attempting to precede it. In these and other activities, the basic objective of all African governments, whether military or civilian, one-party or multiparty, should be to deliver badly needed services to Africa's long-deprived masses.

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AFRICA'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE NIGHTMARE DESCRIBED

London AFRICA NOW in English Jan 83 pp 58-59

[Article by Brian Slocock]

[Text]

The position of most African economies in the international division of labour — relying heavily upon the export of primary commodities and the import of a wide range of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods — is reflected in their international financial relations.

Unlike domestic economic transactions which take place through a common currency, international transactions require different currencies to exchange against one another, reflecting the differing states of the economies which underpin them. Such foreign exchange transactions can take place through two mechanisms. In the market, the exchange rate will be determined by the pattern of trade between the two countries and the reciprocal demand it generates for each currency. Alternatively the political authorities of the two trading partners may fix the exchange rate to serve other economic policy objectives.

In the former case adjustments in the exchange rate will more or less automatically bring payments into balance but the domestic economy will equally automatically be affected by this adjustment process. In the latter case the domestic economy will be insulated from the pressures of the foreign sector, but the political authorities will need special mechanisms to manage foreign exchange and the possible imbalance in payments that can emerge.

In practice no modern economy can afford to be at the mercy of uncontrolled market forces, so most countries "manage" their foreign exchange position to some extent or other. However, the developed countries, with relatively strong domestic economies and large foreign exchange reserves, do so by limited intervention into the market to adjust exchange rates that are supposedly "freely" determined. This is a luxury which the much weaker economies of Third World countries cannot afford, so their exchange rates are for the most part fixed by government decision.

This is the situation with most African countries. Only two African currencies, the South African rand and the Nigerian naira, "float" on the foreign exchange market and the naira is kept within tight margins by the Central Bank. The fixing of an exchange rate requires that it be set in terms of some other measure of value — either another (internationally important) currency or some "basket" of currencies (such as the IMF's Special Drawing Rights — SDRs). The accompanying table shows how different African countries achieve this.

While the particular standard for fixing an exchange rate may be fairly arbitrary, it has the effect of tying the currency to fluctuations of the chosen standard, which may cause problems. For example, between 1978 and 1982 the Ghanaian cedi had a fixed parity in terms of the dollar, which was appreciating in the world market. The result was that the increasingly overvalued cedi was not only not devalued, but actually *appreciated* in terms of currencies other than the dollar.

The maintenance of fixed exchange rates which may diverge sharply from the actual position of a given economy in the world market requires a number of restrictions if

there are not to be intolerable pressures on the balance of payments. The most important restrictions are those which require state approval for foreign current and/or capital transactions (through such measures as import licensing and foreign exchange controls).

Other measures which may be adopted are the requirement that all foreign exchange earnings be surrendered to the Central Bank in exchange for domestic currency, prescription of the foreign currencies in which international obligations must be settled (to ensure payment in "hard," internationally-acceptable currencies) and the imposition of surcharges or bonuses on certain types of transactions (thus in effect creating a system of "multiple exchange rates").

The only African countries without an extensive set of such controls are Djibouti (reflecting the importance of its free port status) and Liberia (which nevertheless operates import surcharges). All the remaining 39 sub-Saharan members of the IMF impose both foreign exchange surrender requirements and capital transaction controls. Thirty-one of them also have controls on current transactions; 32 have currency prescriptions; and 17 have some sort of multiple exchange rate.

The two non-IMF members, Angola and Mozambique, also have very strict foreign exchange controls.

Within the framework of such restrictions, however, there are some efforts to remove monetary barriers to intra-African economic relations. The most extensive — but at the same time most ambivalent — is the franc zone.

Created as a monetary union between France and its former colonial possessions after independence, the franc zone in fact encompasses two African multinational groupings and their corresponding financial authorities: the West African Monetary Union (Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta and Togo) with the Central Bank of the States of West Africa (BCEAO) and the Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, and Gabon and Chad) with the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). Mali and its central bank is also a member of the zone.

Three African currencies are connected with the zone — the two "CFA francs" issued by the BCEAO and BEAC respectively and the Mali franc. These currencies are pegged at the rate of 50 to the French franc (100 in the case of Mali), are freely convertible into French francs on the Paris foreign exchange market and are supported by reserves held mainly in francs and deposited with the French Treasury, which in turn backs the currencies in question. There are no foreign exchange restrictions on transactions between members of the zone.

The franc zone thus provides its members with a stable and internationally acceptable currency and allows free financial flow within the zone. But as its structure and genesis suggests, it is dominated by the link with France rather than the relationship between the African members of the zone. The effect has been to perpetuate economic dependence on France without doing much for intra-African co-operation.

Thus, for example, about 36% of the total foreign trade of the Ivory Coast and Senegal (the two most important franc zone members) is with France, while Africa trade accounts for only 6.9% and 16% respectively (with about a quarter of this accounted for by oil imports from Nigeria). By contrast former British possessions like Ghana or Kenya only do about 15-20% of their foreign business with Britain.

Another more modest effort to facilitate intra-African financial flows is the West African Clearing House, which since 1975 has co-ordinated payments between the BCEAO and the central banks of Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, allowing the increased use of African currencies in trade between member countries. A similar venture for Central Africa launched in 1979 has yet to become fully operational.

The existence of a system of managed currencies in Africa gives national governments scope to manipulate the monetary system to regulate the economy and promote development. But it is a power which has been used with doubtful wisdom. The main object of state policy seems to have been to treat the monetary system as a bottomless well out of which budgetary deficits and expansion of the state sector can be funded. The effect has been to fuel domestic inflation.

In order to prevent increased import costs exacerbating the situation artificially, high foreign exchange values have been maintained. For example, between 1973 and 1981 African prices relative to those of its trading partners, adjusted for exchange rate changes, rose by 35% — the highest for any region of the world. The figure for Latin America was 10% and for Asian countries a 10% fall took place.

This means that African exports became increasingly uncompetitive on the world market. If, as was more often the case, exporters had to sell at world market prices their earnings were eroded. At the same time imports were artificially cheap.

Some of the main problems of African countries can be linked to this: stagnant

export earnings, excessive imports of luxury consumer and capital goods and erosion of domestic food production in favour of cheap food imports.

The most disastrous illustration of this process is afforded by Ghana. Despite two devaluations, the purchasing power of the cedi compared with the dollar is about one-eighth of what it was in 1976. Recent measures announced by the Ghanaian Government represent a serious attempt to face up to this huge gap using the device of multiple exchange arrangements.

A bonus of 7.5 to 9.9 times the cedi value of exports will be paid to exporters while a similar surcharge will be levied on imports. This has the effect of a massive devaluation as regards current transactions in physical commodities, although invisible and capital transactions will continue at the official rate.

This is opposed by the IMF and undoubtedly looked on very dimly by multinational business, but such a measure could be the beginning of a serious effort to sort out the country's long-standing economic difficulties ●

How African countries fix their exchange rate

Measure	Number of countries
US dollar	8
£ sterling	1
French franc	14
SA rand	2
Spanish peseta	1
SDR	9
Other "basket"	5

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ECOWAS SUMMIT CONCLUDES; LAGOS PLAN 'RESPECTED'

London WEST AFRICA in English 6 Jun 83 pp 1332-33

[Article by Eddie Momoh]

[Text]

THE sixth meeting of ECOWAS heads of state and government ended here last Tuesday with the adoption of 10 more proposals adding to an already long list of proposals still to be implemented by the council. Among the new decisions is that relating to the implementation of a single trade liberalisation scheme for industrial products originating from member states of the community. By this decision, the Council reaffirmed the determination of all ECOWAS member states to work towards a customs union and asked the CEAO to merge its aims and aspirations with those of ECOWAS so as to avoid duplication of efforts and facilitate solidarity towards the creation of a single customs union and economic integration across West African states. The acceptance of this resolution ends several months of verbal wrangling between those states who want to protect their trade and customs and those who advocate free trade within the community. The adoption of this provision here last week by the West African leaders is in itself a dynamic and significant step in the whole community concept, especially in view of the various disparities which have existed among the countries of the sub-region. It has been known for a long time that total trade liberalisation without the rectification of such disparities would adversely affect certain countries without promoting trade or enhancing the economic development of the sub-region. This is why, against the background of the objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action, it has been necessary to retain the ultimate objective of customs union within the sub-region if West Africa is to respect the provisions of the continental programme.

In the final report by the 13th session of the Council of Ministers which preceded the heads of state summit here, it was proposed that the countries of the sub-region should be classified into three groups using cumulatively the following criteria:

—The level of industrial development.

—The importance of customs revenue in the national budget of the member states.

—Problems resulting from lack of accessibility (i.e. transportation problems pertaining particularly to island and land-locked countries). It is also proposed in the report that for the purpose of sub-regional trade, the countries of the sub-region should be classified as follows: Group One: Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Group two: Benin Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo. Group three: Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. In addition the following criteria were agreed upon for the selection of priority industrial products which should have accelerated

The Conakry Summit was attended by Heads of State from Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Also present were the Prime Minister of Niger, the Ghana PNDC Vice-Chairman, the Ivorian Foreign Minister, the Gambian Planning Minister and the Voltaic Ambassador to Ivory Coast and Guinea.

tariff elimination: (1) The products should be manufactured by industries established in the sub-region and must fall under the agreed priority industrial sectors. (2) The said products should be given preferential treatment either because of social considerations (food, housing, health and hygiene) or economic considerations (contribution to industrialisation, job creation, value added or impact on the economies of the states of the sub-region. (3) The products should satisfy in all cases the rule of origin. It is also significant to note that the acceptance of a single trade liberalisation scheme by ECOWAS leaders here, is in keeping with the Lagos Plan of Action, which envisages the setting up of an African common market by the year 2000. The council also adopted the proposal relating to the establishment of national structures in member states.. This means that each member state should communicate to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat information on the organisation of the national body, set up to monitor the implementation of acts and decisions of the policy-making authorities of the community. To this end, a special unit is to be established within the ECOWAS executive secretariat to monitor the implementation of community acts and decisions.

Moral and material support

Other proposals adopted by the leaders include those concerning a development co-operation programme incorporating short, medium and long-term measures; provisions to give moral and financial support to the conference of ministers of youth and sports and to ensure the achievement of all its objectives, renewal and extension of the appointment of the external auditors, appeal to member states and organisations to give material support to Chad and the Central African Republic, agreement by member states to do everything possible to overcome the crisis in the OAU and to safeguard its existence and the rationalisation of co-operation efforts within the West African sub-region. In respect to the last agreement, the heads of state requested the executive secretariat in collaboration with the ECA secretariat, to expedite the completion of the study on the rationalisation, restructuring and harmonisation of West African inter-governmental organisation. In this respect, member states were requested to send in their comments on the study report so that firm proposals on the rationalisation of co-operation arrangements within the sub-region could be presented to the next meeting in 1984.

Two other decisions adopted in the final communique are worth noting. The first is that relating to the creation of a single monetary zone for the sub-region. The heads of states gave current chairman President Ahmed Sekou Touré of Guinea the mandate to take all necessary steps, and in particular to contact the relevant international organisation for necessary assistance so as to carry out necessary studies aimed at the creation of an ECOWAS monetary zone. The chairman may also consider the necessity of forming an ad hoc committee of heads of state to assist him in this task. This would relate to community trade and the improvement of such monetary and payments arrangements as would further promote sub-regional trade. Previous studies have proved the desirability of ensuring the convertibility within the sub-region of all the national currencies of member states and subsequent efforts have been geared towards preparing a programme that would bring this about. The other decision worth mentioning is that relating to regional industrial development co-operation policy. The heads of state agreed to give priority to those industries which contribute to the development of the following sectors:

—The rural sector in order to achieve self-sufficiency in food and raise the standard of living of the rural population.

—Transport and communications infrastructure.

—Natural resources.

—Energy sector.

But despite the apparent unity demonstrated in the final communique it was clear from earlier speeches by member states that certain issues are particularly worrying to the whole community and in some cases, the community is split in half. One example of this is the mushroom of regional groupings in Africa. There are 35 of these in the continent, many of which are useless and insignificant thereby posing unnecessary handicaps to more serious and worthwhile organisations. This point was stressed by Nigeria's Shehu Shagari in his keynote address at the summit. He said: "Another serious concern to me is the proliferation of inter-governmental organisations in our sub-region with very similar aims and objectives. There seems to me to be an urgent need to streamline the existing institutions in the interest of our

economies and eliminate institutional overlaps or conflicts of objectives which only hamper our march towards the achievements of our desired development goals." President Shagari said that the other organisations in the sub-region should confine themselves to specialised functions and "those that are not so geared should be wound up, in the interest of solidarity and optimal utilisation of limited resources to fewer organisations that we can more adequately support to pursue our objectives". The Nigerian leader said that "times are hard . . . and we cannot afford to be extravagant". This was an obvious criticism of the flamboyant life-style of the ECOWAS secretariat. He went on: "The sizeable sums of money spent annually to maintain the community's institutions including the secretariat, as well as the time, sums and energy spent . . . cannot be justified if we allow ECOWAS to degenerate into a talking shop where very little concrete action is realised."

For his part, Liberia's Samuel Doe admitted that there has indeed been "the concern of possible conflict which the Mano River . . . causes for ECOWAS". But that apart, he said "we must realise that a small group of countries can promote economic co-operation and integration more rapidly than a larger group". He went on: "Countries that are more or less at the same level of development when grouped together, will find it easier to agree on specific projects which would be impossible if there were wide differences between these countries."

Nigeria "saved" by Sekou Touré

There was suppressed surprise here too that Nigeria, which a few months ago expelled more than two million West Africans, was not put in the dock at the summit nor was there any direct reference to the issue. But this was all due to President Sekou Touré's pragmatism and diplomatic shrewdness. He spent several hours, day and night before the summit was officially opened, meeting various heads of state in their villas and discussing the matter privately rather than putting it on the agenda for public trial. Nevertheless, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary's Annual report which was being circulated here, admitted that the community's immigration programme "is not being implemented as correctly or vigorously as it could have been", adding that events during the year showed "widespread ignorance of the provisions of the protocol by both the public and government officials".

Immigration issue put back

According to the report, ECOWAS will convene later this year a meeting of immigration and legal personnel of member states to review the implementation of the first phase of the protocol.

In his acceptance speech as ECOWAS current chairman, Guinea's Sekou Touré called for the establishment of various pressure organs such as a West Africa youth community, a West African women's community, a West African labour community workers, farmers and intellectuals, a West African community of universities and research centres and parliamentarian union of West African states. He said such organs would educate youths in their sense of duty while orientating them in the proper direction to assess values in a meaningful way. The Guinean leader said: "If we want to have citizens of tomorrow capable of picking-up where we left off in the pursuance of our objectives, we must make sure that we set-up as of now, such regional organisation."

The next summit will be repeated in Conakry, Guinea and Sekou Touré will become chairman for the second time. This is because Ivory Coast which should have hosted the 1983 summit asked Conakry to do so, and next year should be Guinea's turn.

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NIGER BASIN AUTHORITY TALKS: SPEECHES WITHOUT DIRECTION

London WEST AFRICA in English 6 Jun 83 p 1333

[Text]

THE eight-nation Niger Basin Authority (NBA) which includes Benin, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Niger, concluded two days of talks here last week still trying to define their own objectives and programme. The following heads of state were present:

President Mathieu Kérékou of Benin, Guinean Sekou Touré (host and chairman), Moussa Traoré of Mali and Shehu Shagari of Nigeria. Cameroon was represented by Prime Minister Bello Bouba Maigari, Ivory Coast by Foreign Minister, Siméon Aké, Upper Volta by Jean-Baptiste Ibboudo, ambassador to Guinea and Ivory Coast and Prime Minister Oumarou Mamane of Niger. A communique issued at the end of the summit said little and was vague. The leaders of NBA, it noted, made specific directives to the executive secretariat, "to observe strict discipline in the management of the authority's funds". Observers here interpret this to mean a reference to the financial scandal and administrative indiscipline which continues to hamper the NBA progress coupled with its own general lack of cohesive direction. The summit also directed the executive secretariat and council of ministers to make efforts to implement village and pastoral programmes in member states. Here, too the communique cannot say more. But summit observers believed it was a reference to a muted concern by NBA members to develop their huge wealth in natural resources and that of the River Niger itself, its tributaries and sub-tributaries by undertaking consistent harmonised and scientific joint ventures toward promoting integrated economic advancement.

It said the summit had prepared guidelines for achieving objectives of organisation, and instructed the executive secretariat to stengthen co-operation with other regional and sub-regional bodies for a better co-ordination or their programmes of action. The meeting was brief and lacked general enthusiasm. This was an indication of a growing disillusionment among the leaders about too many tiny organisations in the West African subregion whose only achievement is to meet annually in cosy surrounding and make the same marathon speeches.

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POOR STATE OF NIGERIAN ECONOMY DEVELOPS INTO MAJOR ISSUE

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[Text]

THE POOR state of the Nigerian economy has inevitably developed into a major issue in the country's coming elections. Foreign exchange problems, import licence difficulties and import prohibition have led to production cut-backs in local manufacturing plants, shortages of many consumer goods and higher prices. These developments would be god-sent news to opposition politicians anywhere, and in Nigeria much capital has been made of them.

Sadly, however, the discussion of the economy's problems so far has not transcended the level of politicking. The first objective usually is to find a scapegoat, of whom there are many; then rosy solutions are offered, which cannot stand close examination. The rhetoric then tries to confuse the issues, and all too frequently succeeds in merely diverting attention from the basic problems.

There appears to be a wide acceptance within the country that the current problems are only symptoms of a bigger underlying fault — represented in the economy's almost total dependence on oil export revenues. These revenues, in normal times are big enough to provide a comfortable cushion; unfortunately, times do not remain normal for long, and the result is that since the mid-1970s, Nigeria has been living a kind of Pharaoh's dream — three fat years followd by three lean years — with disasterous consequences for the economy. There also appears to be general agreement on the urgent need to get the economy off its roller coaster; but how to do it has remained a matter of serious disagreement. A significant part of the population apparently finds it hard to believe that there is no painless way to bring about a change.

Nigeria's experience of frequent economic adversity has produced many lessons which could easily be turned into advantage. Apart from the widely accepted and basic one — that it is dangerous for the country to be so highly dependent on one product, there is the industrialisation

policy which has been proved to be inappropriate. Import substitution industrialisation that is based on imported raw materials, it is now realised, may create jobs and help in the transfer of skills, but it does not reduce in any significant way the outflow of foreign exchange. There is also the question of policy-making itself, and the bureaucracy it produces; the fits and starts that have characterised Nigeria's efforts in this direction have been demonstrably counter-productive, while the excessive bureaucracy it has produced, has worked mainly as a hindrance to better utilisation of the country's resources.

In agriculture, the Green Revolution Programme appears to have already checked the decline of food production, although its success is still not big enough for everyone to notice. The effort has to be continued for some time for it to achieve the desired goals.

The problem of diversifying the revenue base on the other hand has hardly been tackled at all. It is clearly a multi-faceted problem — requiring action in many areas like industrial policy, foreign trade, finance, and even agriculture. It is also the issue most likely to get bogged-down in controversy, as is all too evident in Nigeria now. On industrial policy, the government has already started measures to get local manufacturers to use more of local raw materials and less of imported ones. But under pressure from the shortages of consumer goods that have occurred, officials have appeared to panic, blaming the manufacturers of either hoarding the goods or refusing to use local raw materials.

The recriminations gave the impression that officials expected the shift to local raw materials to have already taken place, while it should be clear to them and anyone else that the programme would only be realistic if executed over the medium term. On foreign trade and external finance a coherent policy has not even been formulated; rather what exists is a jumble of short-term measures designed to tackle the immediate difficulties. What is required, however, are a set of policies which will make it possible for the country to export other goods apart from oil in significant quantities, attract foreign investment and perhaps encourage the repatriation by Nigerians of money which they currently keep in foreign bank accounts.

One policy area that seems capable of bringing some improvement overall, concerns the value of the naira. But although the Government accepts that the currency is highly over-valued, it is determined not to devalue, partly it is thought, because it resents the IMF telling it what to do. National pride is one thing, but it also ought to be clear that there is no way much can be achieved in the direction of diversifying the export base without some form of devaluation. A compromise is indeed provided by the multiple exchange rate system; it would make it possible for the government to retain some of its pride,

but also, and more importantly, would make it possible to export goods manufactured under Nigeria's high cost environment, and encourage Nigerians and other nationals to bring foreign exchange into the country.

The prospects for the Nigerian economy are indeed not as bad as they have frequently appeared in recent times. To realise them, however, would require that the economy be kept on course and that both those who now rule the country and those who hope to rule should be able to raise their sights a little above the immediate difficulties and look ahead.

CSO: 3400/1593

FRANCE'S TRADE UNION OFFENSIVE REPORTED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 25 May 83 p 8

[Text]

The **socialist-oriented** *Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail* (CFDT), subtly encouraged by the French government, has worked hard during the past 20 months to improve its contact with African trade unions. CFDT secretary-general **Edmond Maire** and his deputy, **Jacques Cherèque** (also in charge of international relations) in 1982 visited **Senegal, Togo, Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire** and **Zimbabwe** and have recently returned from a trip to Zaire, Zimbabwe, **Mozambique, Zambia** and **Tanzania**. One of CFDT's main objectives is to reduce the influence over African trade unions of the **Soviet Union** and the **United States** and their satellite international offshoots: the pro-western *International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* (ICFTU) and the Prague-based *World Federation of Trade Unions* (WFTU).

To convince African trade union barons to strike a more independent path, the CFDT has been closely collaborating with the OAU's trade union grouping, the Accra-based *Organisation of African Trade Union Unity* (OATUU). For the last five years CFDT has participated in OATUU economic training sessions for African trade unionists. In association with the *European Federation of Trade Unions* (EFTU), an umbrella organisation also trying to break from superpower domination, CFDT is to participate in a session at the beginning of May in Dakar to thrash out new proposals for the Lomé III negotiations, due to start this autumn. CFDT has a special body, *l'Institut Syndical de Coopération Technique et Internationale* (ISCTI), which is subsidised by the ministry of cooperation and development, to organise training sessions for African trade union leaders. Last September it hosted 15 OATUU cadres from countries such as **Algeria**, Senegal, Zaire, **Cameroun, Guinea**, Togo and **Niger**. Bilateral cooperation agreements have recently been signed with Zaire's UNTZA, Zimbabwe's ZCTU and **Tunisia's** UGTT.

The two other main French trade unions are seeking to advance their own pawns on the African chessboard. Right-wing *Force Ouvrière* (FO), affiliated with the ICFTU, has since 1961 organised annual African training seminars in Paris. Last September, representatives from 18 African states were present. OATUU cooperated with the organisation of these meetings. FO's international affairs specialist, **Claude Pitois**, aims to compete with CFDT activities in Africa by sending out FO missions. FO will probably strengthen its relations in particular with African trade unions close to the ICFTU.

The Communist-backed *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT) has also been active. In 1975 it established its own training body, *le Centre d'Etude, de Recherche et de Coopération Internationale* (CERCI). African trade unions close to WFTU naturally turn to the CGT for help, but the latter maintains relations with Senegal's UNTS and Tunisia's UGTT. The CGT also has a working relationship with OATUU. It has sent instructors to Togo, Niger, **Mali, Mauritius, Congo** and **Madagascar**. The CGT's international affairs secretary, **Gilbert Julis**, says that the CGT is open to links with all African trade unions but naturally has the closest ties with those unions sporting an "anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist line". The CGT was surprised when it recently received a request from the Nigerians to train union leaders.

The religious-oriented *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens* (CFTC) has not as yet woven links with African trade unions. Its first initiative will be in **Namibia**, where its secretary-general, **Guy Drilleaud**, headed a delegation last month ●

CSO: 3400/1593

PEREIRA ON OAU, AGRARIAN REFORM, DROUGHT PROBLEMS

Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 28 May 83 p 11

[Interview with Aristides Pereira by FRANCE PRESSE; date and place not specified]

[Text] We conclude here the interview which Comrade Aristides Pereira gave FRANCE PRESSE in Dakar during his last visit. In the last section, the journalist broaches questions such as the next ECOWAS [Economic Community of West Africa] summit, the problem of free movement of peoples and protection of the emigrant, the Agrarian Reform in Cape Verde and the ICDCS [Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in Sahel].

The FRANCE PRESSE Agency: The ECOWAS summit met a few days ago in Conakry. We know that it was invited and was to participate personally. There is a problem that will be brought up, namely, the defense and nonaggression protocol among member states. Can you tell us why Cape Verde did not sign the protocol?

Aristides Pereira: On this point, we have confined ourselves to following the ECOWAS charter, which is an economic community. In our opinion, since we are already participants in the nonaggression agreement signed among member states, we have no need to be connected with a defense agreement among member states unless we find it advisable. Our reason is very simple and without any "review" or any bearing on other member countries: in our opinion, once it is a question of an economic community, we can completely "pass" regarding this defense pact.

AFP: Let us talk about another problem which also causes concern. It is about the free movement of peoples. After the expulsion of Africans from Nigeria, this problem acquired a certain magnitude in the African picture. How do you think the protocol on the movement of peoples can be improved?

Aristides Pereira: In my opinion, it is somewhat difficult to improve the protocol. Everything depends on the kind of relations which are established among the states and in this regard, I think a discussion on this matter will be worthwhile at the heads of state level and an agreement should be made with the view to a better application of this protocol. However, as long as there is some suggestion that can be made to improve this protocol with the

view to giving more guarantees to workers in the various African countries, we are not against it. Obviously, we shall be in agreement since we are also an emigrant country.

AFP: Speaking of emigration, what is Cape Verde doing for the purpose of organizing communities for greater progress in economic development?

Aristides Pereira: We have a large community abroad and, unfortunately, so far we have not achieved what we would wish regarding the Cape Verdian abroad, but it is something on our government's agenda. We have in mind the establishment of a support institute for emigrants, and thus profit by the experience of other countries which have the unusual situation of emigration and communities abroad, countries like Portugal, Algeria, Morocco, Yugoslavia or Senegal. We should take advantage of all this experience and do something to respond to our emigration needs which can also, in a more evident way, include the participation of Cape Verdians emigrants in the reconstruction of our country.

AFP: The president recently presided at an important ceremony for distributing land within the framework of agrarian reform. The People's National Assembly's approval of the law early this year gave rise to some rumors which disappeared in the series of elucidating campaigns. Are we asking too much to give us a brief sketch of the objectives and general lines of this reform?

Aristides Pereira: We have already said several times that agrarian reform is something which involves a certain onus because of its very name, but this law approved and now implemented, essentially interprets our country's efforts to improve agriculture and is perfectly adapted to the very special conditions which distinguish Cape Verde. On this principle, we have begun to give definite form to it, aiming essentially at applying modern methods to agriculture and giving certain assurances to the man working the land, the peasant, the small farmer and every landowner who are devoting every means possible to get the best results from the small amount of land at our disposal. We have only 20 percent of arable land in our country and land has to be put to the best use possible, not only from the soil and other conservation viewpoints, but also regarding technical assistance which is indispensable if we take into account the extremely primitive methods of working the land which until recently our peasants were using. However, it is on this principle that we have undertaken this agrarian reform, which we think is to everyone's satisfaction, especially bearing in mind that during all this time we have not ceased to offer opportunities to all interested parties, by not limiting them to the peasant who works with hoe in hand but to all those who are interested in the land. We are convinced that the results will not be long in coming, bearing in mind that, despite the persistent drought, we must give great attention to agriculture, since a large percentage of our population depends on the land.

AFP: What measures have been put widely into use at your country's level for safeguarding it from drought effects?

Aristides Pereira: Unfortunately, we regret the fact of facing another dry year. According to reports reaching us, last year we were the country most badly hit, we had a harvest which was 20 percent less than normal, which obviously entails great hardships and, especially, bearing in mind that rainfalls were minimal, with little effect on infiltration and reloading the water tables. This leads to problems even with the irrigated crops, and, this year we have been obliged to reduce the irrigated areas precisely as preventive measures to safeguard the water tables. But, despite this, we are continuing our efforts in the search for water, we are continuing our efforts to conserve water and protect soils, and, in sum, we are waiting improvements but prepared for the worst.

AFP: Speaking now of the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in Sahel, have your efforts been successful in financially achieving the projects in the Sahel region?

Aristides Pereira: In the case of financing, we can say that there have been considerable difficulties, especially bearing in mind the amount the Arab countries, during President Traore's administration, put at ICDCS's disposal and also the Italian Government's decision, made last year, to put at ICDCS's disposal a considerably substantial sum, which to a certain extent guarantees a large part of the financing of the various projects which are underway in our countries. However, we cannot say that the financial organizations have shown any interest in the various ICDCS countries' projects and respond to all needs, but we can say that a large part is being covered, and we are sure that by continuing the struggle to affirm our organization's credibility and guarantee its operation, we shall be fully able to achieve the objective we desire.

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CSO: 3442/259

IRON ORE PROJECT REPORTEDLY TO BE SCALED DOWN

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3437, 27 Jun 83 pp 1519, 1520

[Article by Mark Doyle]

[Text] Six thousand million dollars. That, at current Free-on-Board prices, is the approximate value of Senegal's proven iron ore reserves. Small wonder then, that President Diouf recently gave "priority status" to the Falémé mines project in the south-west.

But the President's blessing may not be enough to persuade the world's currently oversupplied iron and steel makers. And all of the $6,000m. will not, of course, pour into state coffers.

The *Miferso* company, set up to exploit the mines and sell their potential to investors expected to part with over $1,000m., is made up of the German Krupps (23.8 per cent), the Japanese Kanematsu-Gosho (23.8 per cent) and the French Serem (23.8 per cent), with the State taking the remaining 28.6 per cent of the capital.

The falémé project is the most ambitious to date of the *grands projets* which the Government hopes will fuel economic "take-off". The ore deposits are in the extreme south-east, and will require a new 200km. rail link to Tambacounda and upgrading of the line to Daker. The ore will then be evacuated via a new port at Bargny, just south of Dakar.

The railway line, which the State alone will have to find money for, will cost about $600m. This is the lion's share of the cost of the whole project, but is small compared with infrastructure required at other mines. If the money can be found, work will start on the line in 1987.

Work on the port will start a year later, and is projected to cost $200m. The port, the plan forsees, will be able to load ships up to 250,000 tonnes, three times the maximum size that Buchanan (Liberia) or Nouhadhibou (Mauritania) can cope with.

The ore itself, especially at the largest and most accessible deposit of Koudekourou, can be mined with relative ease, and direct investment required will only be $200m. 337m. tonnes of ore would be mined at a rate of 12m. tonnes per year over approximately 25 years. Mining would be open cast, making costs $5.9 per tonne (according to Miferso), lower than those in Guinea (projected at $7.6 per tonne) or at the giant Carajás mine in Brazil ($6.5 per tonne).

It is hoped that the project will directly create 3,650 jobs. The majority of management posts, as with other African mines, would probably go to expatriates. 1,800 jobs would be at the mines, until they are exhausted; 1,500 people would be required to build the railway; and 350 would work at the port, which could be used for other goods after the ore runs out.

Satellite activities around the mines would give a living to many thousands of others, and the project could be integrated with the OMVS Senegal River project, using electricity generated by the Manantali dam. The gold mines at Sabodala, also to be exploited in partnership with Serem, would benefit from the infrastructure to be established.



And so, apart from familiar arguments against capital-intensive, export oriented, raw material, enclave development strategies, Falémé looks promising. The ore is relatively rich, relatively cheap to exploit and, in terms of returns to Senegal's small modern-sector economy, abundant.

But will the market bear investment for an extra 337m. tonnes through the 1990s? Initial approaches for finance have already been made by *Miferso* to the World Bank, the EEC, the French *Caisse Centrale*, the Arab banks and OPEC.

One problem is that several West African iron ore mines are due to come on stream over the next decade. Two of the main ones, Guinea's Nimba-Mifergui and the joint Congo-Gabon Mekambo/Ivindou, are due to start production at the same time as the Senegal project.

Thus by remarkable coincidence the expected upturn in demand at the end of the decade, led by economic recovery in the industrialised countries, will be matched by increased supply. In fact this will be no coincidence. All of the foreign partners in the *Miferso* venture are also steel producers, who are keen to ensure diversified supply at low cost.

Miferso's sales executives, currently on tour in Western Europe, have found some encouragement, partly because buyers fear political problems for Guinea's ore evacuation via Liberian railways.

Nevertheless, it is likely that financiers, in particular the EEC, will encourage a scaling-down of the project, meaning that the cost of the railway to the State will have to be spread over a longer period.

This will not be popular in Dakar, but it has been a function of large scale projects such as this that small local partners don't have much choice. President Diouf himself, when he gave the green light to the project, said that Falémé would not receive any financial support or subsidy, that "the market" would decide. He may not like the decision.

CSO: 3400/1595

FINANCIAL IRREGULARITIES INVESTIGATION RESULTS

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3436, 20 Jun 83 pp 1450-1451

[Text] THE COMMISSIONS of Inquiry set up by the Sierra Leone Government to investigate financial irregularities and malpractices in the expenditure of government funds remitted to the provinces between January 1, 1977 and December 31, 1981, including the collection of market dues, continue to hear startling revelations of malpractices which could best be termed "bare-faced and unscrupulous robbery."

Millions of leones allocated by government for the development of projects in the provinces; for salaries of government workers, many of whom have turned out to be non-existent; for the construction and maintenance of government buildings; for petrol and maintenance of government vehicles and various other government services, found their way into the coffers of individual civil servants, the commissions were told.

Cancelled cheques

The Wilson Commission in Makeni which is investigating financial malpractices in the Northern province was told how a cheque initially made out for Le40 was eventually cashed for Le40,000 by an accounts clerk, Mr. Nathaniel Ekundayo Thomas. According to evidence submitted at the Inquiry, Mr. Thomas has made the cheque No. 011775 payable to one Brima Sesay for Le40, which according to the cheque stub in the series of that cheque book was later cancelled. However, the actual cheque was not attached to the cancelled cheque stub as is the usual procedure, but was found to have been cashed for Le40,000.

Questioned about the policy of cancelling a cheque, Mr. Thomas told the commission that both the main cheque and stub should be cancelled, and the cheque attached to the stub. He said he had made a mistake in not cancelling the actual cheque.

Counsel for the state, Mr. S. Tourav then put it to him that the cheque was cashed on May 9, 1981, for Le40,000, with him being the recipient, as his signature was at the back of the cheque. Mr. Thomas insisted that he did not receive the money, and argued that when he took the cheque to the bank, he was told that there was no money.

Missing goods

The Commission also heard from interdicted Northern provincial secretary, Mr. S. E. Johnny, how he paid Le16,500 to one Lamina Conteh for the supply of ten typewriters, but received none. He told the commission that after paying the money to the alleged Lamina Conteh, he never saw him again, and therefore had to buy three typewriters out of his pocket. He denied a suggestion from the counsel for the State, Mr. S. Touray, that the said Lamina Conteh never existed.

Another witness, Mr. Edward Koroma, finance clerk at the District Office, Tonkolili, Northern province, recalled preparing a payment voucher h197746 for Le60,550 in May, 1981, for chiefdom development projects. He said that this was done on the instruction of the then District Officer, Mr. W. B. Minah, presently senior assistant secretary in the Minis[illegible] of De-

fence. He admitted that the voucher leaf was not part of his accountable documents, nor was the transaction entered in the Vote Service ledger.

The Wilson Commission also heard from the Central Chiefdom Administration Clerk, Mr. M. B. Kamara, how Le88,391.34 meant for backlog payments for chiefdom administrative staff in the Bambali district was misused. He told the commission he did not know any of the chiefdom administration clerks whose names appeared on the supporting payment documents, though he had served in the chiefdom administration for over 15 years.

A similar practice of misappropriation was reported at the commission by Mr. Eddington Kamara, finance clerk of the district office in Kabala, also in the Northern province. Mr. Kamara told the commission that he was instructed by the district officer to enter additional names to payment vouchers for which they gained Le7,000 monthly. Of this amount, he received between Le200 and Le250 from the district officer who insisted that these fictitious transactions should not be entered in the Vote Service Ledger.

Another witness, Mr. S. T. Turay, assistant central administration clerk, recalled that in 1981, a sum of Le66,172.68 cents was credited to the account of the central chiefdom administration in respect of "other charges". He said that although the money was meant for the chiefdoms, he withdrew from it Le12,000 in October 1981 and handed over the money to the district officer on the instruction of the central chiefdom administration clerk. Another Le23,000 was withdrawn as "draw back" for workers. At the inquiry being held in Kenema, Eastern Province, the Alghali Commission heard evidence of how Le200,000 remittance from the Kenema sub-treasury to the accountant general in Freetown as alleged payment of revenue for January 2 to April 30, 1981, was never recorded in the remittances register of the Bank of Sierra Leone.

No records

In his evidence before the commission, an assistant director of the Bank of Sierra Leone attached to the Bank's Kenema branch said that if such a remittance had been made, it would have been recorded in their register, and such an entry would have been signed by top officials of the bank.

The assistant director went on to explain that even if remittances were made out by commercial banks in Kenema, as long as these were meant for the government accounts, the Bank of Sierra Leone would have been advised on the matter. He tendered in evidence the bank remittances register and pointed out that no government remittance on cheque no. 086350 of May 13, 1980 was made by the bank.

Official endorsements

Another piece of startling evidence was that submitted in respect of Kono district, Eastern province. The treasury sub-accountant, Mr. Ibrahim M. Serry of the district office, Kono, told the commission that he prepared and paid out 13 cheques totalling Le100,470 for the various chiefdoms in Kono, but could not remember why these cheques were endorsed by the senior district officer for payments to be made in cash. He agreed that the cheques were paid upon endorsement of the co-signatories of the account — himself and Mr. A. Moiwo, the assistant district officer. Mr. Serry was also shown another set of eight cheques signed by himself and Mr. Moiwo for Le126,720.24c, being monies withdrawn from the Kono branch of the Sierra Leone Commercial Bank.

The witness remembered collecting the monies from the bank, but could not recollect the types of payments made with them. Mr. Serry was shown another set of cheques for Le99,557.61 for which he remembered collecting the money from the bank, but could not tell the circumstances in which payments were made. The witness was shown other cheques which were co-signed by him and the then senior district officer, Mr. V. B. Foh in March and April 1981 to the tune of Le70,000, as alleged grants to Koidu, Yengema and Ansarul Secondary schools and to the central chiefdom administration.

Open cheques

In his evidence, the former assistant district officer, Mr. A. Moiwo, who co-signed these allegedly fictitious cheques with Mr. Serry, said he could not tell what happened to the monies for which he and Serry endorsed cheques, and collected monies from the bank on behalf of alleged recipients and chiefdoms in Kono. Mr. Moiwo said that although the cheques ought to have been crossed those for

chiefdoms were made open on the request of the Central Chiefdom Administration clerk in Kono.

The interdicted Central chiefdom administration clerk, Mr. S. E. Kamara Musa, told the commission that no cash payment was made to the chiefdoms in Kono by the sub-treasury, as was alleged by the sub-accountant, Mr. Serry, and the assistant district officer, Mr. Moiwo. He said that at no time were salaries paid to the staff on the central chiefdom administration and other chiefdoms in Kono and that he was only seeing cheques for such payments for the first time. Asked whether he knew the whereabouts of the monies, Mr. Kamara-Musa replied that they must have gone to the beneficiaries who endorsed the back of the cheques.

Alleged printing

Giving evidence on the misappropriation of market dues in the Kenema district, an interdicted daily wage clerk, Mr. Ibrahim Kamara, told the Alghali Commission that he received monies from market dues collectors and paid part of them to the assistant district officer before making deposits at the bank.

He referred to an instance when he gave Le1,000 to an assistant district officer for the alleged printing of market dues tickets, and reported that he gave out monies in like manner regularly to the assistant district officer for the same purpose.

Similar evidences of payment of salaries to non-existing chiefdom administration staff, misappropriation of funds for development projects and various other anomalies were also heard in the Tejan Commission of Inquiry in Bo, Southern province. All three commissions are expected to complete their assignments shortly and present their reports to government.

CSO: 3400/1597

CONFUSION, DENIALS SURROUNDING POLITICAL UNREST, REFUGEES ISSUE

London WEST AFRICA in English 30 May 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by Eddie Momoh]

[Text]

THE SIERRA Leone Government for the second time in a week, has gone out of its way to deny international news reports of serious political unrest in the Pujehun District. It said such news has come "as a complete surprise to the government and people of Sierra Leone". The BBC, as is usual here, was particularly mentioned, but the government's attack this time lacked the usual jaw-breaking punch. This, and the fact the denial was unusually brief, suggested that it was merely for local consumption to dispel fears, while at the same time refusing to admit it had blundered in a crisis that may later prove more embarrassing, with even wider repercussions.

On May 21, Elwa Radio monitored in Freetown, announced that Liberia's ruling Peoples Redemption Council (PRC) had despatched a team of security personnel headed by Army Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Henry Duba, to the southern borders between Sierra Leone and Liberia. They were sent to assess the situation and organise emergency relief efforts for more than 1,000 people described as refugees, who had crossed the borders from the Pujehun District in Sierra Leone. The Liberian Government had sent $37,000 worth of food and drugs to the area.

The next day, Head of State, Samuel Doe, despatched his Foreign Minister, Dr. H. Boima Fahnbulleh, with a note to President Siaka Stevens in Freetown, assuring him, according to official sources here, that the refugees would receive all the necessary assistance and protection while in Liberia. The note said the Liberian leader hoped the Sierra Leone Government would find an early solution to the problems so that the refugees can return home. But by the time Dr. Fahnbulleh arrived in Freetown, the government here had rejected the Liberian Government claim, saying that it was not aware of political unrest or of any political refugees.

The same day, Liberian radio in Monrovia, broadcast an interview with Sierra Leone's Ambassador to Liberia, Sahr Randolf Fillie-Fabo, who angrily reacted to the Liberian authorities' handling of the matter, accusing them of being "undiplomatic". He said he should have been the first person to have been notified by the Liberian Government and what action it was contemplating. In the same emotional tone, Mr. Fabo described the refugees as "fugitives fleeing from justice" and claimed the number involved was under 200. He attacked the Liberian authorities of "engaging in an anti-Sierra Leone slandour campaign". Mr. Fabo's figure sharply contrasted with the 1,000 announced by the Liberian Government quoting a representative of the UN High Commission for refugees, whom it said had literally counted the refugees at the border. Independent sources told *West Africa* about "hundreds of people fleeing" into Liberia. One source, a prison warden, who asked not to be identified, spoke of the village of Fairo, and scenes of several months of fighting razed down and "people being slaughtered like pigs". The village of Malema is also reported to have been deserted while a couple of others have been warned by warring political groups that their houses will be burnt down if they do not

choose between death and running away. Other people from Malema who came to Freetown over the weekend of May 21-22, have been quick to draw comparisons with events in the Koinadugu District in 1977, when a village was burnt down and several hundred people reportedly killed due to fierce political rivalries.

On May 24, the Foreign Minister Abdulai Conteh met with the local press to further deny the Liberian claims. But in doing so added more confusion to an already confused situation. He said the government was not aware of any political disturbances at least on the scale as was implied in the news broadcast. Contrary to the first statement released by the government, Dr. Conteh admitted "Indeed there have been a number of incidents not only in that part of the country but even in Freetown itself, and we've had movements of people but certainly not on the scale to warrant the gravity and intensity with which the incident was reported in the news". He further revealed that as a result of last year's general election, there has been a wide scale of "dissatisfied" people who are presently seeking redress in the law courts. "One would not, therefore, like to say in view of these developments, that there has been a mass exodus of refugees into Liberia", he urged.

The latest clashes in the Pujehun District and the reported number of people on the run, heightened the bloody fighting which has been going on between the two rival groups of politicians, the Demby and the Kpaka supporters, since the inconclusive general election last year.

It all started when little-known Solomon Demby, better known to come from Gerihun in the Bo District, was nominated as a candidate to contest against Mr. Mana Kpaka, one of Sierra Leone's best known and outspoken politicians in the Pujehun East constituency. Mana Kpaka who had represented the constituency for over a decade, was also widely said to be a political foe of Attorney-General Francis Minah, who was believed to have rallied forces to unseat him.

Although Minah comes from the Pujehun West constituency, his position as cabinet minister and his very close relationship with President Stevens (though this is losing its shine) has made him wield commanding powers in the entire Pujehun District. So his support for Demby was a foregone conclusion as to who was to win the elections. But the Kpakas who have never lost this particular constituency, were not ready to accept a defeat in any form. So they similarly ganged up against the Minah and Demby factions. At the end, Mana Kpaka lost the election. But the Kpaka faction who is confident that the election was rigged has continued to fight back with frequent bloody clashes. These frequent incidents were intensified when in November an outspoken secondary school teacher, a pro-Kpaka, was bundled into a party landrover and driven outside the village of Zimmi where he was mutilated and killed. The entire independent press in the country protested and asked for an official enquiry. But President Stevens accused the press of distorting the facts about Kemokai's death. He promised to come down heavily on any journalist who continued to "put words in the mouth of the police".

The latest fighting and the refugee situation once again brings into focus the fraught relationship between Dr. Doe's government and the authorities in Freetown. But in all one thing is clear: the fighting in the Pujehun District will go on until some solution is found by the authorities in Freetown, but that too is a hard political nut to crack.

CSO: 3400/1597

STEVENS REFUTES RUMORS ON CHANGES IN CONSTITUTION

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3433, 30 May 83 p 1324

[Text]

President Stevens has refuted rumours and international press reports about imminent changes in the Sierra Leone constitution, *writes a correspondent in Freetown.*

In an address in Bo recently, President Stevens made mention of a BBC interview with Mr. A. P. Ganda of SLAM in the programme *Focus on Africa* about alleged constitutional changes in the country, and described the report as "irresponsible and without foundation".

He said that reports such as those which border on crucial issues ought to be checked with the Sierra Leone High Commission instead of from someone "who had been accredited on three occasions as Sierra Leone's representative overseas, and had failed the nation woefully."

The talk of imminent changes in the Constitution has been widely rumoured in Freetown over the past six months. This rumour recently found its way on to the front page of the May 7 edition of the independent news sheet *Watch* with the headline "Cracks within the wall. . . . Constitution to be Amended?" The article which was later quoted by one of the BBC African programmes said in part: "Unconfirmed but unusually reliable sources hinted here this week that hotly canvassed plans are afoot for the ushering in of a major amendment that will abolish the high office of executive president and the two vice-presidents, creating instead a ceremonial president and prime minister.

"When the political maestro, Dr. Siaka Stevens was the then Prime Minister with Justice C. O. E. Cole as ceremonial president, the latter was stripped of his powers by the former within a 48-hour period to become executive president.

Political observers find it interesting that this article, which had been published in Freetown a week before the BBC programme referred to by President Stevens, had received no official reactions when it was published locally.

The nation patiently waits to see whether the rumour and talk of abolition of the position of executive president to be replaced by a ceremonial president and a prime minister is, as President Stevens has said, "without any foundation."

CSO: 3400/1597

GOVERNMENT CLOSER TO DECISION ON FUTURE OF NEWSPAPERS

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3433, 30 May 83 p 1324

[Text]

Government has taken a step towards a final decision about the future of newspapers operating in Sierra Leone, with the issuing of two circular letters to two categories of newspaper editors.

The first which was circulated among the four editors whose newspapers "qualify" to continue to print, ie, *Daily Mail, We Yone, Progress* and *Flash* informed the editors that "their application to register had been accepted". It requested them to pay the initial fee of Le2,000 to the Registrar General to enable them to obtain their certificate of registration.

The second letter which was sent to the other newspaper editors acknowledged receipt of their application for registration, and added: "Before coming to a final decision on your application, I would like to invite representations from yourself or your counsel as provided for under Rule 7(3) of the Newspaper Registration Rules. Both letters were signed by the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Dr. Moiwo Korji.

According to Rule 7(3) referred to by the Minister, "Before the Minister rejects an application for registration, a proprietor or counsel representing him shall be entitled to be heard by the Minister."

Rule 7(4) further states "that in the event of an application for registration or renewal being rejected or the certificate of registration being suspended or cancelled by the Minister, it shall be the duty of the Minister to inform the proprietor in writing that such application has been rejected, or the ceritifcate or registration cancelled. Every such written information to a proprietor under the proceeding rule shall include a statement in summary form of the grounds for such rejection, suspension or cancellation." Rule 8 states that "a proprietor whose application for registration has been rejected, or whose certificate of registration has been suspended or cancelled, may appeal to the High Court within 30 days from the issue of the written information by the Minister for such rejection of the application or cancellation or suspension of the certificate of registration."

CSO: 3400/1597

FINANCE MINISTER JUSU-SHERIFF INTERVIEWED ON SUCCESSION ISSUE

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3436, 20 Jun 83 pp 1447-1448

[Interview with Jusu-Sheriff by Eddie Momoh]

[Text]

Q: A lot of people tell me you are one of the hottest names for the presidency after Siaka Stevens; how do you react to that?

A: I'm not aware that I am in the race for the presidency; but this question comes up so often that I think I ought to say something about it. My position is, it will be timid of me to get frightened and run away whenever people talk about leadership. That will not be right because I've been in the politics of this country since 1962 as long as everyone else. I've served in government and I've led one of the most difficult periods of opposition in this country. Having said that, I should say the decision on who becomes successor to the President, while the President is alive, is partly but largely the prerogative of the people of this country. At the moment, my primary interest is to do my best to improve this country's economy. If I were to get involved in a leadership struggle and contest at this stage, I'll be doing considerable injury and damage to my main objective of coming into the government. When the President asked me to come, he asked me specifically to come to the Ministry of Finance to help and therefore I can see an element of an assignment in my joining the government — an assignment that is not unrelated to my own background. So while I don't think that the politics of it is unimportant, I feel quite frankly that it takes second place to my primary objective of improving the country's economy. I don't want people to believe that if I were tipped, and believe me I haven't been, that this is something extraordinary. As far as the politics of this country is concerned, we all know that by age and experience the President is above everybody; we also know that there is a hierarchy as such but as a parliamentarian, I don't think I can concede seniority to many. I am here to do a job and that is what really I'm interested in at the moment. I hope that gives you some idea.

Q: Would you accept the presidency all the same if it were put on a plate and handed to you today?

A: That is an hypothetical question and I think when the time comes, we should be able to answer that question.

Q: Your critics have condemned your leadership of what remained of the SLPP before Stevens declared the one-party state; some say if anything you should personally be held responsible for the collapse of the party and the eventual introduction of the one party because you were not able to hold the opposition together and therefore gave the APC government the *carte blanche* for the constitutional change. It is for this reason of lack of effective leadership in the SLPP that your critics say you should not become president. What do you say to them?

A: Of course in a situation like we had, there must be a scapegoat. If we came out of power and some people had to be held responsible, and since I was more or less the acknowledged leader of the young

educated group in the party. I'm not surprised that people should talk like this. Let me say this, that within the SLPP itself, there was a group of us . . . I mean people like Dr. Yilla, Kaisamba and Matturi, who were critical of our own administration, even Sir Albert did not hide the fact that I was leading this group of people against him, but on the whole, we kept some kind of dialogue disagreement until the downfall of Sir Albert. But even then there was a little more contact between Sir Albert and myself than people thought. For example, at the election that followed, he was often in touch with me and sent me money here and there.

All that Sir Albert seemed to have wanted us to do, was to acknowledge that he was still the SLPP leader in exile. To many of us he was not here and therefore that was not material; but of course to him, it was an emotional matter. If you're in public life, you must expect to suffer and be maligned; therefore if the SLPP got out of power, somebody must become the scapegoat and be held responsible. Some internal dissidents had to be responsible and therefore the responsibility was supposed to be mine, Brewah and Kaisamba and those friends of ours who were not in politics. But I won as an SLPP candidate, I remained as SLPP. I never crossed over. I was the last SLPP to lay down my mantle after being liquidated by law and after a full consultation with party executive as it existed at the time. So this is it . . . by standing on constitutional grounds, the SLPP was never proscribed, it was never dissolved. It is true that I was aware that Kaisamba and Brewah had said that as far as they were concerned the Governor-General could appoint whom he liked in his constitutional right and that they would not back Sir Albert. It is true also that I did nothing to persuade them . . . that was partly because I knew I could not persuade them anyway and at that time I also believe that if they wanted to stand their ground, we did not interfere with each other that far, especially when you knew that the man had his convictions. By the time we had returned to civilian rule, Brewah had already become an APC member; so he suddenly went into war with me until they kicked him out of government and he died. Kaisamba was not a man who changed his mind. I agreed when the Governor-General said a national government should be formed at that time. I did not oppose it and I also wanted that, if it came to it, we should go into opposition and I made that point clear to Sir Albert.

So it was not a question of my wanting to kick Sir Albert from the leadership. But in my intellectual romanticism at the time, I felt that there was really nothing wrong in going into opposition. After all, a handful of us kept them at bay until the one-party came. Maybe we all made mistakes here and there; maybe Sir Albert did. Maybe if you look at it from the purely sectional view, maybe we were over-broadminded, over-educated for our own background and in our circumstances. Therefore so many things happened that we did not anticipate. But we have long accepted this as one of the incidences of history and we are leaving it to the young scholars to assess our role and performance.

CSO: 3400/1597

KOROMA OPENS PARLIAMENT SESSION, REPORTS ON COUNTRY'S SITUATION

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3437, 27 Jun 83 pp 1504-1505

[Text] THE SECOND session of the fourth Parliament of Sierra Leone was recently opened with first Vice-President, Mr. S. I. Koroma occupying the high office of President in the absence of President Siaka Stevens.

This event which is usually shrouded with pomp and pageantry, provides an annual opportunity for government to give an account to the nation of its stewardship during the past year, and to highlight its priorities for the ensuing year.

Strictly speaking, the five-page address, the shortest in the history of Sierra Leone, contained very little. The endorsement by the UN General Assembly of Sierra Leone's application for the status of a least-developed country was highlighted by the acting president as "an important event for Sierra Leone." This endorsement, he said, was followed by a visit to Sierra Leone, last March, of a UN multi-agency mission whose findings are expected to be submitted to the UN Secretary-General shortly.

The address mentioned the Development of Industries Bill which is soon to be put before the House for approval, and disclosed that the Bill offers various facilities and incentives designed to provide a framework for building up a strong industrial development programme.

On the agricultural sector, Mr. Koroma reported that during 1981/82, the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board spent about $21m. on the importation of rice. This, he said, represented 75 per cent of the total foreign exchange earned by the Board for export crops for the same period. He lamented this state of affairs, and reiterated the government's policy of encouraging local production of food, especially rice, as well as export crops through price and other incentives. In the forestry sector, a development package has been prepared and submitted to donor agencies for funding. The project aims at increasing the supplies of timber and fuel wood, with prospects for the establishment of a pulp, paper and plywood industry.

On mining, Mr. Koroma reported that the total value of minerals exported in 1982/83 was Le93,788,565, a drop of almost Le11m. when compared with 1981 exports. Le3.8m. worth of gold was exported by the Bank of Sierra Leone. Negotiations for the development of the kimberlite deposits are still in progress, and an agreement is expected to be concluded soon.

Mr. Koroma recalled the adoption by government of the five-year tourism master plan, and assured private and other entrepreneurs of government's cooperation in granting them the relevant investment incentives to assist in the development of this sector.

Government policy in education, the acting president went on, "continues to be the expansion of primary education within the shortest possible time, with a view to achieving universal primary education. He highlighted the recent successful conclusion of negotiations with the EEC for the construction of a faculty building and dormitories for students of Njala Universi-

ty College. On health, the opening of the Para-medical School at Bo was given special mention.

Acting President Koroma confirmed that the Sierra Leone Housing Corporation, a government organisation responsible for providing housing for all income groups, particularly low income earners, has started operations. Its initial assets include the OAU village, the Kissy Low Cost Housing Estate, and the 500 low-cost houses presently under construction.

Turning to road development, the acting President said that feasibility studies of the Peninsular road and the Kenema-Koindu road financed by the government of Kuwait and the UNDP respectively, as well as that of the Freetown-Monrovia link road financed by the government of West Germany have all been completed.

He reported that the government had decided to grant improved conditions of service to judges and that the new terms and conditions, presently under preparation, will be embodied in a separate Act of Parliament. He commended the army and police for the "significant" role they continue to play to ensure stability, maintenance of law and order and internal security, and disclosed that the government was seriously considering expanding the forces to ensure maximum protection of the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Mr. Koroma recalled the introduction of the modified exchange rate arrangement and the consequent receipt of 20.7m. SDR for the IMF under its compensatory financial facility. He affirmed that negotiations were currently underway with the IMF for a standby arrangement. He finally expressed government's appreciation to all "friendly countries", international institutions and other donors for their assistance and support, and expressed the hope that they would continue to give maximum cooperation "on a more massive scale realising the plight of the country."

This is the first time in the history of the 12-year-old republic that the opening of Parliament has been performed by someone other than the President, Dr. Siaka Stevens. Political observers view this development as a sign of gradual abdication of power by President Stevens who started sounding a warning about his retirement two years ago. The question of his succession still remains a mystery, but the general feeling is that there may be some truth in the recent rumour about imminent changes in the Constitution (*West Africa*, May 30) which may qualify his first Vice-President, Mr. S. I. Koroma for the post of ceremonial head, and Mr. Salia Jusu Sheriff, a hot favourite, for the post of Prime Minister.

Altogether, the 1982/83 session of Parliament which has just ended, has been the dullest and most unproductive in the annals of parliamentary activity in Sierra Leone. Parliament held sittings 29 times altogether out of a total of 385 days in the parliamentary calendar, and the issues deliberated on were as lame as a duck. These included the debate on the presidential address, the debate on the budget, the ratification of the constitution of UNIDO and the International Cocoa Agreement; the legislation of the 1982 Excise Act and the revised Appropriation Bill; the ratification of the Convention of the Pan African News Agency (PANA); and the proposals for the Modification of the Foreign Exchange rate arrangement.

It is indeed sad that Parliament, which boasts of a large number of academics and well-educated politicians, did not think it necessary to debate burning issues, both national and foreign, which affected the lives of the people they purport to represent. One would have thought that the two-tier arrangement, the implementation of the press bill, the non-release of the much-promised Development Plan, the escalating high cost of living, its causes and attendant repercussions, the continuing post-election violence in many parts of the country, the recent alleged exodus of Sierra Leoneans into neighbouring Liberia, of which government has said it is "not aware"; and a host of problems pertaining to the rural areas, may have been worthwhile subjects for debate at several sessions including Question Time.

Commenting on this unfortunate decline of parliamentary activity, an official of Parliament intimated that this crop of MPs have not been sending in questions nor private members bills. He added that Parliament can only meet when there was something to discuss. It is hoped that this new session of Parliament will be more vibrant, and that MPs will justify to the disappointed nation, their salaries of Le3,825 per annum, their constituency allowance of Le100 per month, their sitting fee of Le10; their travelling and car allowances; and the Le916,492 voted in the Estimates for the operations of the Sierra Leone House of Representatives.

CSO: 3400/1597

SLAM CRITICIZES APC GOVERNMENT

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3437, 27 Jun 83 p 1532

[Text]

A large cross section of the Sierra Leonean community in London met on Sunday, June 19 at the Africa Centre to discuss the "continuing deterioration of the country's economy and the recent spate of violence in Freetown, Pujehun and Koinadugu Districts," *writes a special correspondent*. The meeting was organised by the London-based Sierra Leone Alliance Movement (SLAM).

In his opening address Mr. Ambrose Ganda, chairman of SLAM, said that recent events in the country have vindicated the stance SLAM has taken over the past two years. He criticised the government's failure in halting the decline in the economy and its apparent inability to stop the recent crisis and political violence in the south of the country. "What we need in Sierra Leone is not cosmetic changes but a radical transformation of our society which would see the complete removal of the Stevens' regime," Mr. Ganda said. He emphasised that never in the history of any country has a government been so "subversive of the welfare of the people they purport to be governing".

After Mr. Ganda's speech the Secretary General of SLAM, Mr. Adewole John, then moved on a swift attack on the APC government activities, illustrating his speech with newspaper cuttings and other tape recorded materials. He said the government's record on human rights is nothing but "deplorable". Starting from 1957 to the last general election Mr. John gave instances of human rights violations by the APC, reminding his audience that if the SLPP was "undemocratic and thuggery" like the APC in 1967 there would never have been an APC government today. "The situation today in our country calls for drastic remedies," he said. "I appeal to all Sierra Leoneans to forget tribal and sectional interests and rally round the banner of SLAM as the only organisation capable of liberating our country from the vicious and exploitative policies of the APC."

The general consensus was that the one-party system of government has "failed the nation" and that alternative methods of government "must" now be tried. The meeting also felt that one of the most unfortunate characteristics in Sierra Leone politics today is the constant mudslinging and the undue emphasis on personality rather than policies.

The Chairman of SLAM was congratulated for spearheading the fight against institutional corruption and nepotism in the country.

CSO: 3400/1597

GENERAL VILJOEN EXAMINES CONVENTIONAL THREAT TO RSA, SWA

Pretoria ISSUP STRATEGIC REVIEW in English Jun 83 pp 2-8

[Article by Gen C.L. Viljoen, Chief of the South African Defence Force]

[Text] 1. INTRODUCTION

The military threat to the RSA and SWA centres mainly round the revolutionary onslaught by the *African National Congress* (ANC), the *South West Africa People's Organization* (SWAPO) and the *Pan Africanist Congress* (PAC). The development and extent of the threat is determined by the degree of willingness on the part of international organizations and the super and great powers — the Soviet Union in particular — to become involved in the struggle. The growing build-up of conventional weapons and surrogate forces in the RSA's neighbouring states is an indication of the Soviet Union's willingness to become involved by supplying military, financial, political and moral support to the neighbouring states and to the aforementioned terrorist organizations to which these states are host. Russia's intention is apparently to provide a defence umbrella in the frontline states for their own protection but also as a refuge for terrorists. This provides a firm foundation for possible future actions.

2. SOVIET STRATEGY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

The USSR's strategy for action in Southern Africa is a part of its so-called global strategy aimed chiefly at the protection and defence of Soviet interests and at world domination. In carrying out its strategy for Southern Africa, the Soviet Union follows a predominantly indirect strategy carried out on all power bases, namely the political, economic, military and psychological levels. As regards action on the military level, Soviet strategy provides in the first instance for a revolutionary onslaught, but at the same time does not exclude action and escalation towards a more conventional onslaught. The following factors, among others, influence the nature, extent and time scales of such a conventional threat:

(i) The attitudes and actions of the super and great powers, as well as developments in other areas of conflict outside Africa.

(ii) Events in Africa and in South Africa in particular.

(iii) The development of the military situation with reference to the RSA and SWA.

(iv) The gradual build-up of the military infra-structures in the RSA's hostile neighbouring states.

The Soviet Union has for a long time been interested in the mineral wealth of the RSA, but this interest has seldom been more clearly expressed than during talks between President Leonid Brezhnev of the USSR and President Barre of Somalia, when the latter was still an ally of the USSR. Brezhnev declared: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends — the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Southern and Central Africa . . ."[1]

Soviet dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in the *South African Communist Party* (SACP) and attacks by the ANC and SWAPO, as well as disagreements in the academic, political and military factions within the Kremlin, led to the creation in 1981 of a so-called "Co-ordinating Committee for Southern Africa" in Moscow. Although there are still differences, this committee has already reached unanimity on a number of strategic priorities concerning Southern Africa:

(i) Consolidation of Soviet influence in the RSA and SWA's hostile neighbouring states.

(ii) Development of the military capabilities of the neighbouring states.

(iii) Greater support to and co-operation with the ANC.

(iv) Development of greater internal support for the ANC and SACP.

(v) Involving the RSA on as many military fronts as possible.

(vi) Regional and international isolation of the RSA.

(vii) An improved information gathering effort in respect of the RSA and SWA.

(viii) Greater emphasis on undermining activities within the RSA and SWA.

Priority is still given to consolidating the influence of the Soviet bloc in the RSA's neighbouring states and to building up military forces in these states so as to limit the RSA's freedom of action. By means of mutual liaison, increased arms supply, the signing of various treaties and the presence, in growing numbers of Soviet bloc personnel, the Soviet Union is strengthening its position in Angola and Mozambique particularly, and there are continued efforts to draw Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Lesotho into the Soviet sphere of influence.

3. POSSIBLE ESCALATION TOWARDS A CONVENTIONAL ONSLAUGHT

The possibility that the present low-intensity terrorist struggle may escalate towards a more conventional level, is receiving constant attention, especially in the light of the involvement in Africa of Soviet and surrogate forces. The possibility of such an escalation is determined by the following:

(i) The desire and/or will to attack.

(ii) The intention to attack.

(iii) The reason or excuse for attacking.

(iv) Acceptance of the consequences.

(v) The ability to act militarily.

3.1 Desire and/or will to attack

There is no doubt that there is a fundamental desire on the part of some Black African states to attack the RSA with conventional weapons. Proposals in this regard were advocated by the OAU as early as June 1974 with the formation of the so-called OAU Task Force. It is also known that the RSA's neighbouring states have been approached by SWAPO and the ANC to protect these organizations with conventional weapons at their bases, training camps and other facilities in these states. MPLA forces in Angola have already used conventional weapons against the RSA during operations across the border by the RSA's Security Forces against SWAPO. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe has also voiced support for combined military action against the RSA.

3.2 Intention to attack

This factor is associated with the desire to attack on the part of a country or organization and is a direct result of it. Analysis of the military budgets of hostile states and the expansion of their conventional military capabilities can be an indication of their intention to attack. In this regard, it is illuminating to note that the RSA's hostile neighbouring states have over the past six years, expanded their military forces by about 300 per cent to a total of roughly 270 400 troops (see figure 1). At least 10 per cent of this is made up of surrogate forces, including Cubans, Soviet and East German troops. The Soviet Union continually uses its embassy personnel and surrogate forces to incite the RSA's neighbouring states to more aggressive action against the RSA. The Soviet ambassador to Botswana, M N Petrov, who may be seen as the co-ordinator of the revolutionary onslaught against the RSA, may also play an important role in the more conventional onslaught.



Figure 1: **Increase in Levels of Military Power in the RSA's hostile neighbouring states.**

3.3 Reason or excuse for attacking

An enemy wishing to attack a country is seldom hard put to find a reason or excuse for its actions, provided the desire and intention regarding conventional action are there. In respect of the RSA, with its rich mineral resources and its strategic position regarding the world's oil and trade routes around the southernmost tip of Africa, it is not difficult to find a suitable excuse for action against the RSA. The "struggle against racism" and the events surrounding the independence of SWA are typical examples, and have already led to co-operation between the so-called frontline states.

3.4 Acceptance of the consequences

It stands to reason that an enemy must accept the consequences of its military actions before initiating the offensive. Thanks to the RSA's strong military capability and preparedness, the country is still in such a position that not one of its hostile neighbours is ready to engage it in an offensive conventional military struggle. The RSA's military capability, therefore, serves as a reliable deterrent, ensuring its sovereignty against any hostile aggression.

3.5 The ability to act militarily

It is known that the RSA's hostile neighbours have considerably expanded their conventional military capabilities over the past six years. The capability of these states in respect of tanks has increased by about 300 per cent (see figure 2), while aircraft strength has increased by about 200 per cent (see figure 3). These countries have also extended their air defence systems in the form of radar cover and air defence weaponry. Conventional military weapons alone, however, do not ensure offensive military capability for a country. A well-developed military infra-structure as regards organization, command and control, logistics, training, economic strength

and internal stability is an essential prerequisite for such offensive action. In the African context (African Task Force), countries are still experiencing problems regarding leadership, language, differences in training, standardization of equipment, and so on, which greatly impedes the effective utilization of such a task force against the RSA in the short and medium term.



Figure 2: **Increase in tanks in the RSA's hostile neighbouring states**



Figure 3: **Increase in aircraft in the RSA's hostile neighbouring states**

4. CONCLUSION

In the light of the factors mentioned and of various other factors such as poor economic conditions, internal instability, relatively deficient physical infra-structures, the inability to properly maintain or to replace advanced military equipment, and discord arising from old regional conflicts, the African countries (individually and collectively) pose no real offensive military threat to the RSA. It is essential to point out, however, that the RSA, as a result of the conventional build-up in the hostile Black neigh-

bouring states and their support of the terrorist organizations (ANC, SWAPO and PAC), is forced to act against these organizations with conventional weapons. For example, the RSA is acting with conventional weapons against SWAPO in Southern Angola.

The conventional build-up in the RSA's neighbouring states is also linked to Soviet strategy for Southern Africa, since the conventional weapons supplied to these states by the USSR are used to defend terrorist bases and headquarters. The air defence systems, in particular, are used in a defence role.

The conventional military threat to the RSA, therefore, lies chiefly in the fact that the USSR is actively disturbing the military *status quo* in Southern Africa by the continuous supply of more modern and heavy arms to the RSA's neighbouring states. In this way, the USSR achieves strategic mobility for itself and keeps its advantage over the West in terms of influence in Southern Africa. The possibility that the RSA may become involved in a full-scale conventional war, therefore, may not be entirely ruled out, particularly in the case of a drastic escalation of the East-West conflict and/or if the revolutionary struggle develops into a conventional war. The latter possibility, however, would depend on the direct involvement of the USSR and its satellite states in the conflict situation in Southern Africa.

In this context, the remark by President Nixon in his book *The Real War* is still relevant. "There is no mystery about Soviet intentions. The Kremlin leaders do not want war, but they do want the world."[2]

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1. Nixon, R. 1980. *The Real War*, Warner: New York, p 23.
2. *Ibid*, p 2.

CSO: 3400/1592

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF NATION'S MINERALS DOWNGRADED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 11 May 83 pp 1-4

[Text]

Conventional wisdom is that western industry would be catastrophically affected by any significant disruption of mineral supplies from South Africa. Chrome, manganese, vanadium, platinum group metals (PGMs) and associated products are the materials from South Africa upon which the West most depends - in steel-making, aerospace, electronics, energy and defence industries. South African production of the above four minerals remains extremely important strategically for the West. However, the relative importance of the South African supply has declined progressively during the last 10 years, and will continue to decline. There are four broad reasons why:-

1) Other countries are developing production of the four minerals. In many cases they benefit from being closer to consuming countries; from lower local labour costs; from lower overall production costs; and from their favoured status as developing countries.
2) Industrialised country governments, for strategic and domestic political reasons, have a) begun to introduce protectionist measures to safeguard domestic production of associated products (ferro-chrome, ferro-manganese etc), and b) established in many cases more realistic programmes for building national stockpiles of strategic minerals.
3) Technological advance and changing demand is resulting in the gradual use and development of alternative materials. (Plastics, polymers, ceramics etc).
4) The apparent inability of the South African government to dismantle significantly *apartheid* is increasing the pressure on western governments to prepare options for a measure of tactical disengagement from South Africa: a) for reasons of international diplomacy and trade b) in some cases to an extent because of domestic political pressure, and c) for longer-term political planning, to gain a better position for preempting future **Soviet**, East European and **Chinese** influence in Southern Africa.

Below we set out South Africa's production of the four critical minerals in the global context, and then comment on strategic stockpiling in the West, the progress of substitution technology, and how all this is shaping future foreign policy to South Africa.

Chrome and ferro-chrome

South Africa is presently the world's largest single producer of chrome ore, accounting for nearly 30% of world output. It holds between 70% and 80% of known world reserves of chrome. Currently South African output is about 2m tonnes per year (tpy), down from 3.8m tonnes in 1980, and a large number of mines are either closed or are operating far below capacity.

While a large part of the decline in its chrome production can be blamed on the recession, and the resultant cutback in steel production, which is the largest consumer of chrome, growing competition from other chrome producers is a more important reason. South Africa's competitors - **Zimbabwe**[1], **Turkey, Albania**[2] and the **Philippines** - have been selling chrome ore aggressively throughout the recession, making inroads into South Africa's share of the market. More recently, the *Tiebaghi* mine in **New Caledonia** has come on stream and is expected to sell close to 100,000 tpy into South Africa's Far East markets.

Albania, which has greatly expanded its production capacity and is a fierce competitor for chrome ore sales, has become the single greatest threat to South African sales. It is expected to sell nearly 100,000 tonnes of high grade chrome ore to **Japan** alone this year, much of it in "barter" trade for steel pipe and industrial machinery. Albanian sale prices undercut most South African production. Albania's chrome ore output in 1981 was about 1.15m tonnes. It's economic development plan provides for an annual 30% increase in capacity till 1985. An accurate current production figure is unavailable, but is estimated at about 1.3 tpy.

A new 136,000 tpy complex was brought into operation in **Madagascar** last year. **Finland** continued its sales in Europe and the **United States** competing with South Africa. Another trend, perhaps temporary, has been the increasing export of chrome from the **Soviet Union** to the Far East and US markets. The Soviet Union, traditionally the second largest chrome producer after South Africa, appears to have usurped South Africa last year. While Soviet ore is not particularly high grade, it has a ready market in the growing lower grade ore markets worldwide. Experts agree the Soviets will probably devote an increasing percentage of their production to their own consumption.

The increased chrome production by the above countries has undermined South Africa's sales in its traditional markets. In Japan, for example, South

Africa's market share has slipped from 50% to 30-40%; its US market share has dropped from 45% in 1977-80 to about 35%.

A critical factor in chrome ore sales is the health of the South African ferro-chrome industry, since just over half of its total chrome ore production is used in domestic ferro-chrome plants to produce bulk alloys. It is the world's largest producer of ferro-chrome, with an installed capacity of 800,000 tpy, almost all of which is exported world-wide for the stainless and special steel industry. Last year South African ferro-chrome plants were running at half capacity. As with its declining chrome ore sales, the main reason is increasing competition from other ferro-chrome-producing countries.

Because of the recession, several industrialised countries, including those of the EEC and Japan, have adopted protectionist barriers to imports of ferro-chrome in order to prevent their own higher-cost ferro-chrome plants from floundering. Domestic demand not satisfied by domestic production is usually allowed to be filled by imports, usually under a system of preferential tariffs which give lower duties to imports from developing nations. South Africa, lacking any formal trading agreements with its major trading partners, and ineligible for "developing nation" status, has lost a good deal of its market share in the last few years. In the big Japanese market South Africa's share dropped from 72.5% in 1980 (170,000 tonnes) to 62% last year (130,000 tonnes).

Zimbabwe, with 325,000 tpy of ferro-chrome capacity, has been South Africa's largest competitor. Zimbabwe's high-grade ore enables the production of high-grade alloys which traditionally commanded a premium to South African production. For metallurgical reasons, quality is often becoming less important, but Zimbabwe's reputation for quality alloys, and its developing nation status, have helped it to sell its ferro-chrome throughout the recession. The country is likely to remain a major competitor for the foreseeable future.

Yugoslavia, Turkey and more recently **Greece** have increased their ferro-chrome capacity and sell heavily in Europe. A 50,000 tpy plant in the Philippines and the long-awaited 50,000 tpy *Facor* plant in **India** started production in March. Two other ferro-chrome plants of similar size are being built in India, which is thus set to become another major competitor. And *Etibank* of Turkey has announced plans to triple its ferro-chrome output to 150,000 tpy from its *Elazig* plant.

To some extent this new production will be offset by the closure of older plants in the US and Europe. While this has happened to a degree, several of the US plants and even some of the European plants,

notably in **Sweden, Italy** and **Norway**, might well revive their ferro-chrome production for nationalistic and strategic reasons. With an increase in the capacity from new low-cost developing nation plants, and retained capacity from older, but politically important plants in the industrialised world, the squeeze on South Africa's market share will continue.

Manganese and ferro-manganese

Much the same situation exists for manganese South Africa, the second largest producer after the Soviet Union, produces about 4m tpy, and is by far the largest exporter. It has reserves of up to 2.5 bn tonnes, nearly half of known world reserves. About 95% of manganese production is used in steel making. There is at present no known substitute.

However, South Africa's dominance as a producer is declining. The *Moanda* mine in **Gabon** is the largest single producer/exporter, with a capacity of about 2.5m tpy. Its exports go largely to Europe and the US. Gabon accounted for 40% of all US manganese imports last year. South Africa accounted for 14%.

The third largest exporter is **Australia**, with a capacity of about 2.2m tpy, nearly half of which is exported to Japan. Expansion plans have been discussed to raise the capacity of the *Groote Eylandt* mine in the Northern Territory to 3m tpy. Known deposits in Western Australia, exploited in the 1950s and 60s, could be worked again if demand or strategic considerations were strong enough.

Brazil is potentially one of the world's largest manganese exporters. It already produces about 2.3m tpy of ore. The Brazilian government plans huge development schemes, including the *Carajás* iron ore and manganese project which is scheduled to start production in 1986-87. First-stage production plans project production of 2m tpy. Longer term plans project 4m tpy. Brazil already accounts for nearly 20% of US imports, and is bound to increase this percentage.

India exports over 700,000 tpy to Japan and another 90,000 tpy to **Taiwan.** Along with Brazil, India is a major producer of manganese for non-metallurgical uses, particularly chemicals and dry-cell batteries, and is likewise set to expand exports world-wide.

South Africa remains the largest producer of ferro-manganese, with a 500,000 tpy capacity, and exports of about 300,000 tpy. Much of this goes to the traditional consumers in the US. Elsewhere South Africa has come up against protectionist barriers, particularly in EEC countries, where the Davignon Commission has established guideline prices and practices designed to protect domestic industries.

The French, **West Germans, Belgians**, Italians and Norwegians have sizeable domestic ferro-manganese plants, all of which are now largely shielded from cheap imports, including those from South Africa. And the Japanese have managed to retain their huge domestic ferro-manganese production throughout the last few years, and are unlikely now to open their doors to imports. This pattern of established industries being protected, combined with new capacity coming on stream to compete for the remaining markets, will continue to erode South Africa's dominance.

Then there is an almost unlimited quantity of manganese reserves on ocean beds in the form of manganese nodules. Research is underway on methods of extracting it. Much of it is being done by countries with the most to benefit from it – particularly Japan and the US, which have negligible domestic manganese reserves. There is little doubt that within 15 years significant amounts of manganese (as well as cobalt and nickel) will be produced from the seabed.

Vanadium

The situation is less clear with vanadium supplies. South Africa accounts for much of the known world's reserves – about 42% – with 17.2 bn pounds of ore. The next largest known reserves are in the Soviet Union, with 16bn pounds. However, **China** has massive but so far unquantified reserves. The US *Bureau of Mines* estimates Chinese vanadium resources at 5.2 bn pounds. Other agencies suggest the figure might be double that.

Vanadium is sold largely in the form of ferro-vanadium for use in steel-making, where it is in great demand as a lightweight, high-strength alloy for special steels. South Africa and the Soviet Union both have a production capacity of about 24m lbs annually. China supplies about 11m lbs per year, although in the form of vanadium pentoxide, an intermediary product. It accounted for nearly 11% of world pentoxide supply to the industrialised world last year, while South Africa accounted for about 40%. However, Chinese production has been growing steadily for five years. South African production has fallen by nearly 15% in the same period.

More recently, the *Agnew Clough* mine in Australia began production of about 2m lbs per year, and is planned to produce about 7m lbs by 1985. US production of vanadium is also expected to increase from about 22m lbs per year vanadium pentoxide-equivalent in 1980 to about 27m lbs in 1985. Scandinavian production, which accounted for nearly 14% of western supply in 1980, will decline only slightly over the period, but could easily be raised again if demand were to increase.

There is no real trend away from South African sources of supply at present since South Africa is a low-cost producer. Chinese production is the greatest threat to South Africa's dominance. Five years hence, along with increased Australian production, Chinese output could radically change the picture.

Platinum group metals (PGMs)

Platinum and its related metals, palladium, iridium, osmium, rhodium and ruthenium, have a traditional, and still large, application in jewellery, particularly in Japan where nearly 400,000 ounces are consumed annually for jewellery alone. However, industrial applications have now outstripped jewellery uses of PGMs. Electrical and electronic applications now account for about 30% of total consumption. In the US the use of platinum in catalytic convertors on automobile exhaust systems has created a large new PGM demand.

South Africa last year produced 2.4m oz of a total world output of 5.9m oz, with the Soviet Union producing 3m and **Canada** 375,000 oz. South Africa has 580m oz of known reserves, followed by the Soviet Union with over 300m oz. Zimbabwe and Canada have large, but not accurately delineated reserves. The Soviet Union has reduced the amount it offers to the free market, probably to push up the present low market price. If demand suddenly increased, such as would occur if South African supplies were in some way disrupted, the Soviets could probably make several million ounces available from stocks.

A long-term trend which will reduce dependence on South African production is the increasing importance of PGM recycling. PGMs, particularly in catalysts, can be easily recycled. It has been estimated that within two years up to 20% of world demand will be met by recycled material largely from Europe and the US. The potential stocks of PGMs available to the free market in the event of any disruption of South African supply are thus growing.

Stockpiling and substitution

No market ever remains stable. Changing world conditions dictate changing business practices. Over a period of relative stability, both economic and political, from the late 1940's until recently, the free markets allowed themselves to become dependent on South African supplies of these four minerals. However, recognition of this dependence has helped to bring about its own solutions. Industrial consumer countries have sought over the past 10 years to diversify their supply sources from South Africa in order to minimise the risk of supply disruptions. The Japanese, probably the most vulnerable to disruptions of supply, have most seriously encouraged the development of alternative sources of supply,

particularly of chrome and manganese, from countries closer to itself. The chrome mines of the Philippines and **New Caledonia** and the manganese mines of Australia and India have all received Japanese financial backing.

Aside from encouraging other supplies, industrialised consumers have pursued two other long-term objectives to protect themselves against any sudden disruption of their traditional supplies. The first and most significant has been the establishment of national strategic stockpiles of critical raw materials. The US government has maintained a stock of materials since the second world war. Its stockpile now contains over 5m tons of various chrome materials, 6.5m tons of manganese materials, nearly 2m oz of PGMs and 1,000 tons of vanadium materials. The Japanese, West Germans and French have for long had strategic stockpiles, held partly by government and partly by industry. Earlier this year the **British** government's strategic stockpile came to public attention. Its first-year purchases included 65,000 tonnes of chrome in various forms, over 100,000 tonnes of manganese products and a quantity of vanadium. Fear of supply disruption from South Africa, and unwillingness to encourage the Soviet Union to become a major supplier, are prominent reasons for setting up the stockpile.

A longer-term, but potentially more significant trend is the research and development of substitutes for rare and costly strategic minerals. Plastics, polymers and ceramics are already used in aerospace and other high-technology applications previously filled by rare metal alloys. Thermoplastics, which are mixtures of glass fibres and polymer, are being developed with the strength and lightness required for alloy substitutes. Metallic glasses, produced by the instantaneous quenching of iron and other inexpensive metals, have remarkable properties. The durability and corrosion-resistance of these materials have already replaced tungsten, vanadium, chrome and other metals in some high-technology applications. Other alloys, using microcrystalline technology of slower cooling of liquid metals, make use of cheap materials such as aluminium, boron, carbon, silicon and iron to produce very tough heat-resistant materials.

Where a material cannot be completely replaced, such as the use of manganese in steel, or platinum in exhaust catalysts, research has attempted to reduce the amount of metal needed to reach the same effect. Similar to the strides in fuel efficiency spurred by the supply disruptions and price volatility in petroleum, these "metal efficiency" programmes have already significantly reduced the amount of platinum needed in electronic switchgear and in catalysts. Research

continues, particularly in the substitution of nickel/silver for PGMs in many applications. These research projects will not result in any immediate and dramatic reduction in dependence on metals for industry. But the trend is clear: industrial vulnerability to supply shocks is being progressively reduced.

And now for some stick

Irrespective of political developments - entailing a further degree of international economic isolation of South Africa, a mutually forced isolation, and/or internal security breakdown-cum-revolution - it is highly unlikely that the production of South African minerals would fall more than say 50% for longer than a few months. Nor would it be practicable for a hard-line anti-reformist South African government to initiate a reduction in exports for political reasons. International counter trade sanctions could now wield far more leverage than South Africa could muster in the other direction if South African unilateral restriction on say vanadium exports actually threatened western industry. South Africa has no option but to continue to try to maximise its export revenue, whatever the political circumstances. The South African economy and its social edifice would disintegrate rapidly if a fervently conservative Afrikaner government insisted on a siege policy.

Western diplomacy in southern Africa has recently been unproductive, partly because the US and other major western countries in practice, in "normal" conditions, have very little leverage over the South African government. The **Namibia** negotiations are a shambles and there is no progress towards more political stability in South Africa. South and southern Africa are strategically important to the West. But because a) the strategic dependence of the West on South African minerals is being reduced below the "critical" level and b) because present collective and individual western diplomacy towards South Africa is doing nothing to secure a good long-term position for the West, American and European foreign policy to South Africa can now only harden ●

THE MAJOR PRODUCERS

	RESERVES (Thousands of Tonnes)	EXPORTS* (in tonnes) 1982	1990**
Chrome			
South Africa	2,500,000	1,700,000	1,000,000
Zimbabwe	1,100,000	580,000	800,000
USSR	391,200	560,000	500,000
Albania	N/A	1,200,000	2,000,000
Manganese			
South Africa	2,400,000	3,700,00	2,000,000
USSR	2,200,000	2,000,000	2,200,000
Australia	95,000	2,000,000	3,200,000
Gabon	159,000	2,500,000	2,700,000
Brazil	N/A	1,500,000	2,500,000
Vanadium			
South Africa	7,800	11	10
USSR	7,260	11	12
China	3,000	5	8
PGM (million troy oz)			
South Africa	580	2.40	2.00
USSR	300	3.00	3.50
Canada	10	0.75	0.60

* Includes material consumed in exported ferro-alloys

** Our projections.

Footnotes

1. During the period of trade sanctions against Rhodesia the Rhodesians became sophisticated covert traders, swapping exports, including chrome, for a wide range of vital imports. The Zimbabwean state minerals agency, the *Mineral Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe,* has retained a flexible approach to sales and still barters for imports (oil and steel products for example), thus often getting an edge in competing with South African chrome marketing.

2. Albanian production in 1970 was about 450,000 tonnes. The world economic boom in the early 1970s prior to the 1973 oil price escalation enabled production to increase to about 600,000 tonnes in 1972. Thereafter production increases fell well below target, and do not appear to have reached more than a 15% annual increase in any one year since then. Until fairly recently Albania's state trading organisation, *Mineralimpex,* was often unable to meet the 38% and 40% chromium oxide content designated for the ore it offered. In some cases the grade slipped to 34% – a grade too low metallurgically for many ferro-chrome plants. However, during the past two years many ferro-chrome plants have altered their processes to take a rawer ore. The traditional premium for "lumpy" ore has waned, and lower grade ores have become acceptable, sometimes preferable. *Phillip Brothers* now handles the largest quantity of Albanian ore exports.

   Politically Albania is unstable. The politburo, presided over by **Enver Hoxha** (aged 74) is riven with latent factions. Following the deaths of two members (**Hysni Kapo** and **Mehmet Shehu**) of the longstanding post-war ruling triumvirate, Hoxha's death (which can be expected within the next few years) could well result in a period of civil disorder. After that it is likely that a younger group of technocrats will assume control, relaxing doctrinaire economic policies (probably leading to conventional methods of international trade instead of the present policy of bartering only) and developing industry, including the as yet nascent ferro-chrome plants.

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UNIFIED MUSLIM RESPONSE TO REFORMS URGED

East Burnham THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English May 83 p 29

[Article by Ebrahim Moosa]

[Text]

The political face of the Republic of South Africa is once again undergoing surgery. The Botha government now has plans well underway to introduce a Gaullist-style presidential system, with a tricameral cabinet representing Coloureds, Asians and whites – but excluding the country's 20 million blacks.

The South African Coloured Labour Party has decided to negotiate with Pretoria on the issue of constitutional reform, despite strong opposition from the 2.5 million Coloured community and warnings from black leaders that their decision would antagonise their black counterparts. South Africa's 0.8 million Asians have yet to make their decision known on whether they will support the government's new plan.

For South Africa's 0.5 million Muslims, the time for a decision is drawing near. Muslims are categorised as either Asian or Coloured in the republic's racial system. As the domestic political pressure mounts for liberation from domination by the minority whites, many churches and political groups have called on the government to dismantle the unjust and repressive system of apartheid by giving political rights to all the peoples of South Africa without discrimination.

Although there has been no government demand for opinions from religious groups over its latest reform policies, the absence of a united Muslim voice renouncing the plans, which exclude their black counterparts, creates grave misgivings as to how Muslims in South Africa are conducting their affairs.

Muslims in South Africa have no distinct political party and it would be unwise for them to foster such ambitions, as racial subdivisions already abound there. But it is clear that Islam's well-defined political content, founded upon a social justice that advocates human dignity, equality and freedom, is the antithesis of apartheid. Muslims have a religiously sanctioned moral obligation to oppose the injustices perpetuated within their society irrespective of race, colour or creed.

In the South African context, the failure of Muslim leaders to challenge the system from an Islamic viewpoint will in the end implicate them as parties to one of the greatest injustices of the decade with reference to the reform plans that exclude the black majority – and will ultimately place this majority in separate "homelands." Most churches in South Africa now advocate an anti-apartheid "liberation theology."

An overall picture of the schizophrenic state that the republic's Muslims find themselves in holds the explanation of many of their shortcomings. Geographically, Muslims are spread over the Cape, Transvaal and Natal provinces. Historically, the Cape was host to the first Muslims, brought there by the Dutch as political prisoners from their colonies in the Malay archipelago. Those in Transvaal and Natal are predominantly of Indian stock.

Muslim leadership in South Africa is undergoing a slow transition. For a long time, Muslims were led by the ulema, whose function was (and still is) essentially that of religious education at the mosque schools and religious duties.

However, the Iranian revolution and the rising tide of Islamic resurgence in Muslim countries has demonstrated the effectiveness of Islam's political content. The fact that Islam could remove tyrant governments and play a practical role in life was well perceived. The

fervour, courage and initiative of Muslim youths was evident from their active role in the countrywide protests in the face of Draconian police measures after the 1979 Soweto riots in an outburst of violence against the government that left many people killed.

With the exception of a few, the ulema are apolitical and incapable of providing leadership of a political nature. A faction-ridden group, they are more at home with their idiosyncrasies over hair-splitting polemics and theological arguments, and clearly lack the disciplines needed to analyse their communities' needs and priorities. Besides being disappointing, they are slowly turning into figureheads: South Africa's four ulema bodies, namely the Muslim Judicial Council in the Cape and the Jamiatul Ulema bodies in the Eastern Cape, Transvaal and Natal, have to date never made public their political stand toward the racist government.

Organisations such as the Muslim Youth Movement and the Muslim Students Association are the most active in student activities at school and university level. Although these movements do make known their political views, they lack dynamic leadership, commitment and pragmatic strategy planning, in conformity with their Islamic ideals in order to solve their problems. Presently, these groups are narrowly based, and this prevents them from identifying with other serious-minded organisations.

These groups have as their primary ideological sources the writings of 20th century Muslim thinkers such as Syed Qutb, Abul Maudoodi, Abul Hassan Ali Nadwi and Ayatollah Khomeini. Superficial implementation of the views propounded by these thinkers – each one differing from the others ideologically, and catering for their own specific societies – creates a blurred vision of goals.

Another stumbling block is the conflict that leads to exasperation between Islamicly-minded professional leaders and the ulema. The former, termed "moderates" or "modernists" by the latter, find it hard to win the confidence of the Muslim community at large. Faculties of Arabic and Islamic studies at two non-white universities staffed by Muslim lecturers are frowned upon as "secularly tainted" and fail to draw students.

Hundreds of South African youths in pursuit of Islamic learning are encouraged by their seniors to study at seminaries on the Indian subcontinent and at universities in the Middle East. However, many of these institutes, especially those of the subcontinent (particularly the various Darul Ulooms) maintain academic standards and curricula that leave much to be desired. The products of these institutions propound anachronistic ideals and views that are highly unrelated to their time, with ijitihad (independent thinking) and innovation sadly lacking. Any delay in remedying this shortcoming poses grave consequences to the Muslims of South Africa.

The Tablighi Jamaat, a religious revivalist group founded in India, has a mass following. But its emphasis on the obligatory devotional tenets of Islam means that it churns out apolitical and complacent followers who show no interest in the liberation struggle.

The fear of strong-arm state security measures, seen especially the killing in detention of Imam Abdullah Haroun, instils a complacency amongst Muslims that allows the domination of the state in complete violation of their religious beliefs. As the curtains close on the South African theatre with the escalation of the liberation struggle, the Muslims will be forced to define their political ambitions.

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ANC-GDR JOURNALISTS AGREEMENT PUBLISHED

London SECHABA in English May 83 pp 22-23

[Text]

Below we publish an agreement between the ANC Journalists' Circle and the Association of Journalists of the German Democratic Republic in the period 1983-1987.

Guided by the desire to develop and deepen the friendly relations existing between the journalists of the ANC and the GDR, and to promote cooperation of solidarity as well as exchange of experiences in professional activities, the ANC Journalists' Circle and the Association of Journalists of the GDR agree to conclude the following agreement for the period of 1983 — 1987.

The measures laid down in this agreement are to contribute to enabling the journalists of the ANC and the GDR to reach, by means of their journalistic work, deeper understanding between their peoples, and for the common struggle for independence, permanent peace, and social progress.

The two sides emphasize the necessity to take all measures to lead by journalistic means, a joint struggle against the plots of imperialism neo-colonialism, racism, and zionism, to expose their aggressive policy especially in the south of Africa in Middle East, in Asia and in Latin America.

Therefore the two sides agree upon:

Article 1

The ANC Journalists' Circle and the Association of Journalists shall, in the coming years, increasingly exchange information on their activities the results and experiences of their work.

This includes:

- **documents of congresses and other important events of the two organisations**
- **studies on training and post-graduate training of journalists;**
- **journalistic literature etc.**

Article 2

Both partners shall consult each other at international journalistic events, implementing their international cooperation on the basis of the decisions of the International Organisation of Journalists (IOJ).

Article 3

Both parties shall support the journalistic activities of permanent and temporary correspondents of the partner organisation in the framework of their possibilities.

Article 4

The Association of Journalists of the GDR is prepared to offer young ANC journalists scholarships in courses at the International Institute of Journalism "Werner Lamberz", College of Solidarity Berlin, according to existing capacities. The costs for transport shall be borne by the sending side. Exceptions must be negotiated from case to case.

Article 5

The Association of Journalists of the GDR is prepared to fulfill the request of the partner to contribute, in the framework of its possiblilities, to the training of ANC journalists in other countries by delegating journalistic experts. Details should be negotiated by the management of the two organisations one year in advance.

This agreement is made out in English and German, both copies being of equal validity.

This agreement shall come into force on the day of signing and will be valid until December 31st, 1987. It will be prolonged automatically, unless one of the two sides will give notice to terminate it.

Amendments must be witten down and need the consent of both parties.

January 31 1983

CSO: 3400/1592

FARM LABORERS URGED TO JOIN LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Gweru MOTO in English May 83 pp 24-25

[Text]

"THERE is evidence of growing discontent among agricultural labourers, and farmers are eloquent about communist agitators and kaffirboeties. But in sober fact there is very little chance of an organised movement among the farm labourers. Ignorance, poverty, isolate and legal restrictions combine to prevent the birth of such a movement."

These words were written in 1939 by a socialist-historian. They are equally relevant in 1983. Although some first steps have been taken by the Orange-Vaal Workers Union in their attempts to organise workers on company owned farms, the position of the vast mass of farm workers remains unchanged.

Today, there are a total of 3,1 million black people living and working on South African farms. The history of how they came to be there reflects on South Africa's forced labour policies. Their role in the future will influence the outcome and effectiveness of the popular struggle for social transformation.

Much of South Africa's political and economic history has been concerned with forcing blacks onto the labour market. The landowners have had three weapons: poll tax, land laws and passes.

Initially much of the labour on white farms was temporary. People entered employment to earn cash to pay taxes. If they were unable to produce the relevant tax receipts the penalty was a mandatory jail sentence.

However, such a system caused fluctuations in the labour supply. This did not suit the landowners. As a result they lobbied the white parliament to pass the Land Acts. The first Act froze the land allocation for blacks and made it illegal for them to buy further land. This soon had the desired effect. The Reserve areas became increasingly overcrowded and correspondingly less productive. For example Transkei in the mid 1930s had a population density of 70 people per square mile and 30 percent landless.

As a result the ratio between temporary and permanent labour shifted in the farmers' favour. People who could not find land in the Reserves sought security on white farms. Over half of the labour force entered into labour tenancy. This meant that the tenant gave 90 days unpaid service to the land owner in exchange for the right to build a hut, graze five animals and till two morgen of land.

Other dispossessed people became cash tenants or sharecroppers. This led to what became known as "kaffir farming"; a situation where the landowners grew rich from tenants rather than agriculture. However this contradicted a secondary aim of the Land Act which was to confine all black people, except bona fide employees, to the Reserve areas. The Act was amended in 1936 to make all forms of sharecropping, half share farming, labour and cash tenancy illegal.

This legislation has massive consequences. Due to overcrowding in the Reserves many tenants reluctantly opted for full time cash

employment Those who refused, or were not accepted, were evicted. The wave of evictions which followed continues up to the present day.

The figures, while stunning in themselves — 1,25 million people "resettled" from white areas into Bantustans between 1960 and 1980 — cannot reflect the realities of such a process. The example of Oranjefontein Resettlement camp in the Transkei is more eloquent. The families who occupy the majority of the 200 ten by ten feet tin huts are sheepshearers. All of them were formerly resident on white farms. The families come from over twenty different districts stretching from Ladybrand in the Free State to Queenstown in the Cape.

They all worked in the same way, banding together locally to shear sheep at five cents each in the season and for the rest of the year subsisting as tenants. Their removal to the Transkei illustrates well the alliance between the landowners and the State. The stock owners, represented by the BKB co-op decided it would facilitate their shearing to have all sheepshearers resident in one place. They contacted the Bantu Affairs Department who instituted their eviction and organised the tin huts and latrines. BKB provided the transport.

In the same year the Deputy Chairman of Bantu Affairs Mr Van Froneman stated the policy clearly: "It must be stressed that no stone is to be left unturned to achieve the settlement in the homelands of non productive Bantu residing in European areas. We are trying to introduce the migratory labour pattern as far as possible in every sphere. That in fact is the entire basis of our policy as far as the white economy is concerned."

To ensure that Oranjefontein people became migrant workers, they were not allowed to own any stock, nor did they have any access to arable land. Furthermore they were not allowed to alter or extend their accommodation because their official status was "temporary". This temporary status has lasted fifteen years.

Events such as this constitute the basic experience of resettlement. An experience that has statistical equivalent in the form of an overal increase of 66 percent in the population of the Bantustans. Some, such as Kangwane, Qwa Qwa and Kwa Ndebele have had increase of between 200 percent and 500 percent as a result.

Having forced "redundant people" off the land, the State and the landowners still had to ensure a constant and adequate supply of labour for the future. To do this they set up labour bureaus. Under this system rural workseekers are put into categories such as mining, construction and agriculture. Once in the category of agricultural worker they cannot change. All agricultural workers are then registered and computerised.

The position of permanent employees on white farms has not improved since the late 1930s and has in fact deteriorated in some respects. In 1939 not more than 6 percent of black children on farms were at school. Education was characterised as interfering with the flow of labour, making workers less docile and disturbing the balance of power between owner and labour.

In 1983 the number of farm children who complete primary education and further their studies is statistically negligable. Despite this the State and white farmers organisations continually claim credit for South Africa's 3 000 farm schools. Their claims wither when put into perspective. These schools are supposed to serve a quarter of the country's black population. There are many documented instances of 110 children classes, of two classes simultaneously taught by one teacher and of 20 km walks to school.

Further and more significantly over 70 percent of these schools are owned and therefore can be closed by the farmers. Thus the farmers have acquired another weapon and its power cannot be overestimated in the overall subjugation of labour.

Workers' wages reflect a similar pattern: a decline in real purchasing power. In 1981 a Government survey revealed a cash wage of R26 a month in the Orange Free State and Transvaal, with benefits in kind worth R31,98. The 1980 Poverty Datum Line estimates were set at between R181 and R206 per month for a family.

Obviously, such conditions make farm labour the most hated form of employment. Work seekers from Bantustans take agricultural contracts only when there is no other alternative. The State and the landowners recognise this, and as a result have sought to augment the labour supply with prison labour.

Over the years, this has led to the building of prison stations all over the country. There are twelve farm prisons in the Western Cape

alone each with 250 convicts. Farmers Associations jointly finance and maintain outstations for prisoners and guards. The Prisons Department supplies food, medical attention and clothing. In 1972 a prison labourer cost the farmer fifteen cents a day.

Not surprisingly a system that relies on coercion to keep it running is not particularly productive. Lack of training and education of the work force incur costs to both workers and the economy. Workers suffer accidents on the job. In 1976, 300 farm workers were killed in farm accidents, and 2 000 were permanently disabled.

Economic costs include excessive expenditure on machine repair and maintenance. In 1982 40 percent of production costs went on machinery, partly because under 20 percent of all tractor operators receive any training.

Many other factors such as increasingly sophisticated production techniques and management requirements, would seem to reinforce the need for worker training. However many farmers are reluctant to train their workers despite immediate economic advantages. This may seem contradictory, but in the context of the long term future, an unskilled and powerless labour force safeguards the power and position of the landowner.

It is indisputable that Apartheid will be smashed to make way for popular democracy. What is in doubt is the ability of a Peoples' Government to effect a Socialist transformation. Unless there is intense activity to independently organise, unionise and train farm workers; unless the agricultural working class is seen as a key area of struggle, a People's Government will be held to ransom by forces more entrenched than those in Zimbabwe.

Such a scenario could include: total dominance by the white commercial agricultural sector, minimal chances of worker control of white farms due to lack of skills and coherent organisation. And high levels of mechanisation and computer technology that would have to be serviced by skilled reactionaries.

Although no-one is disputing the significance of the urban proletariat, it is important that the same working class consciousness and forms of organisation extend to their rural counterparts. Without this there can be no guarantee of a socialist South Africa.

The first steps may have been taken, but where farm workers are concerned, there is still a long way to go. □

CSO: 3400/1592

MINISTER GIVES DETAILS OF TEN-YEAR FOOD STRATEGY PROGRAM

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 16 Jun 83 p 1

[Text] THE National Food Strategy is aimed at providing adequate and balanced food for all through food crop production, projected to increase by 61.5 per cent or 13,205,000 tonnes by the year 1990.

The Minister for Agriculture, Professor John Machunda, told Members of Parliament in Dar es Salaam yesterday.

The Minister was answering a question from **Ndugu T.L. Ndunguru (Mbinga)** who wanted to know the progress made under the national policy on food self-sufficiency, announced ten years ago.

Ndugu Ndunguru also wanted to know how the ten-year experience could motivate peasants for increased food crop production in the years ahead.

Professor Machunda said despite unfavourable weather, lack of essential agricultural inputs — spare parts for machinery and rising fuel prices—food production had increased from 5,926,000 tonnes in 1972 to 8,010,000 tonnes in 1980.

Under the ten-year food strategy programme, stress would be put on irrigation farming and application of improved seeds and provision of necessary inputs, he said.

Professor Machunda said the thrust will be to get each family, village, district and region assigned specific crop production targets.

Professor Machunda said his Ministry also planned to revive and raise production of tea, cashewnut, sisal, pyrethrum, coffee, cotton and tobacco, whose collective output fell from 610,000 tonnes in 1972 to 412,000 tonnes in 1980.

Total production of the cash crops is projected to reach 719,000 tonnes in the next ten years, he said.

Replying to another question by Ndugu Ndunguru, Professor Machunda said the National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) planned expansion of maize, rice and wheat acreage to 51,306 hectares in 1985/86.

The Minister told the House that NAFCO played a significant role in wheat, rice, maize and millet production between 1978/79 and 1981/82, during which the total area under cultivation was expanded from 21,226 to 31,582 hectares.

The total yield increased from 43,449 tonnes in 1978/79 to 74,184 tonnes in the 1981/82 season, he explained. Ndugu Machunda attributed the increase to the expansion of acreage and improved productivity per hectare.

He said the average production per hectare rose to 7.06 tonnes in 1980/81 compared to 6.25 tonnes two seasons back.

CSO: 3400/1581

DAR ES SALAAM REGION TO EARMARK LAND FOR UNEMPLOYED, OTHERS

Dar es Salaam SUNDAY NEWS in English 19 Jun 83 p 1

[Article by Mkumbwa Ally]

[Excerpt] DAR ES SALAAM Region has been directed to earmark farming land for unemployed city residents, Government and parastatal organisations workers, business firms and house wives to engage in food production under the campaign to make everybody work.

The Prime Minister, Ndugu Edward Sokoine, announcing the directive in Parliament yesterday, said the exercise, including registration of those volunteering to take up farming plots should be completed by the middle of next month.

Ndugu Sokoine said implementation of the nationwide campaign based on the Human Resources Deployment Act, passed by the National Assembly last April, would start with Dar es Salaam Region which was the largest single haven of people without formal employment.

The preparations by officials of the City Council and the Regional Directorate in conjunction with the Regional Party Leadership should start immediately, he said.

The Prime Minister said the plots which could also be used for livestock keeping would be located in Dar es Salaam and Coast Regions. The Regional authorities have been directed to arrange for transportation of campaign participants to far off plots.

Those willing to resettle in the new areas should do so, Ndugu Sokoine said. He told the House that participation in the first phase of the campaign was voluntary but legal measures would be taken against loiterers who defied the call.

"The Government will not tolerate any able-bodied city resident insisting on loitering. Legal provisions will be applied against this category and those unwilling to engage in food production in Dar es Salaam will be repatriated to their regions of origin or any other areas of their choice", he said.

The Prime Minister said the Dar es Salaam Regional Commissioner would be in-charge of the campaign and would be assisted by a special advisory committee appointed and chaired by him.

He also directed the City Council to start immediately preparations for provision of the necessary services for implementation of the Human Resources Deployment Act in Dar es Salaam.

Under the Party directive on work for everybody, District and Town Councils become committees supervising the Deployment of Human Resources, he said.

Ndugu Sokoine said the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare would soon appoint a co-ordinator of the Human Resources Deployment exercise to assist the City Council in implementing the campaign.

He said the Government would provide on sale or soft credit, farm implements and seeds to needy unemployed city residents and low income workers volunteering to participate in the campaign.

Food would also be provided on short-term basis to people willing to resettle in the new areas that would be allocated, he explained.

The Prime Minister said under the campaign, unemployed residents may voluntarily employ themselves individually or on co-operative basis in fishing and other crafts including carpentry.

The Government would provide fishing gear and arrange for bank credit for such individuals and groups, he said.

He told the House that middle level and high income employees will be expected to buy farm implements and agricultural inputs on their own.

Ndugu Sokoine said out of 1.3 million people living in Dar es Salaam, only 166,000 or 12 per cent are employed in the formal sector, according to 1981 statistics.

He said the statistics which still present a current picture, over 470,000 residents are unemployed or engaged in makeshift occupations.

The Prime Minister said dependants of workers employed in the formal sector were estimated at 830,000. "The aim of the Government is to assist the unemployed to take up gainful employment in agricultural production, animal husbandry, fishing and other crafts", he stressed.

Ndugu Sokoine told Parliament that the campaign would greatly augument national efforts at food self-sufficiency.

He explained, for example, that Dar es Salaam's actual food demand was presently between 400 and 700 tonnes of maize, rice, wheat, cassava and beans daily.

Under the work for everybody campaign, city residents of all walks are expected to supplement the food supply by producing their own needs and, where possible, surplus for national reserve.

Licensed businessmen have been directed to invest in agricultural production as well while industries utilising agricultural raw materials must establish plantations to meet part of their demand.

Individuals and companies wishing to participate in agricutural production should report to Area Commissioner's Offices, the City Council and Divisional Offices in the City for allocation of land, the Prime Minister said.

He said the Minister for Labour and Social Welfare would soon announce the national directives to be used by regions, urban councils and districts in implementing the Human Resources

CSO: 3400/1581

MINISTER ANNOUNCES MEASURES TO CHECK FUEL SHORTAGE

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 16 Jun 83 p 1

[Text] By Staff Reporters

MEASURES are being taken to check the current fuel shortage in the country and 50,000 tonnes of crude arrived in the country from Iran a fortnight ago.

The Minister for Water and Energy, Ndugu Alnoor Kassum, said yesterday that the Iran crude was beginning to reach consumers after processing.

Several fuel-dependent operations, including passenger services and trucks, have recently been affected by shortage of diesel occasioning long queues at petrol stations.

Ndugu Kassum said plans were underway to get more supplies and orders had already been placed with Libya for importation of 70,000 tonnes of crude which should arrive in the country early next month.

The expected Libyan crude, worth about 180 million shillings, would be enough to meet the country's 30 days demand, he said.

Supplies from the refinery would first go to the strategic sectors of the economy and should help alleviate the present shortage.

The country's requirement was over 700,000 tonnes of crude annually and an addition of between 200,000 and 300,000 tonnes of refined oil products import.

But Ndugu Kassum said because of the country's poor foreign exchange position, it was difficult to meet all the requirements.

Meanwhile the National Bus Company (Kamata), which had suspended its services, resume operations this evening, Kamata General Manager Moses Ndosi said yesterday.

However, despite obtaining the diesel, some of the services will have to be reduced, he said.

The Dar-Itungi route with ten services a week, will now only run seven; the Dar-Arusha ordinary services and the special coach would make daily runs each; and the Dar-Songea route would operate three times a week.

The Dar-Mwanza route would operate three times a week while those of Dar-Mbeya and Dar-Tanga would have daily services.

Ndugu Ndosi said the diesel on hand was enough for up to the end of the month when the situation would be up for review.

CSO: 3400/1581

CENTRAL COMMITTEE SUSPENDS THREE PARTY LEADERS

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 14 Jun 83 p 1

[Excerpt] THE Central Committee (CC) of the Party National Executive Committee (NEC) yesterday suspended from leadership three Party leaders.

The Chairman of the Union of Tanzania Workers (JUWATA), Ndugu Abubakar Mwilima, has been suspended for alleged involvement in illegal foreign currency transactions.

A statement issued in Dar es Salaam by the Head of the Political Propaganda and Mass Mobilisation Department of the NEC secretariat, Ndugu Daudi Mwakawago, said others are a NEC member who was also the Monduli District Assistant Party Secretary, Ndugu Yusuf Rajabu Makamba, and the Ukerewe District Party Secretary, Ndugu Saidi Ng'wanang'walu.

The statement said Ndugu Makamba had been suspended from Party leadership and stripped off his responsibilities for using his position to acquire money through false means.

Ndugu Ng'wanang'walu was involved in illegal transactions of foreign currencies, the statement said.

Ndugu Mwakawago said the Central Committee meeting, chaired by the Party Chairman Mwalimu Nyerere, had taken the disciplinary measures in accordance with the Constitution of the Party.

The Constitution stipulates in Section 71 (3) that the CC may suspend from Office any leader at regional and national level, where it was satisfied that the leader was by virtue of his character and conduct disqualified.

CSO: 3400/1581

BELGIUM TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MARINE TRANSPORT AID

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 13 Jun 83 p 1

[Text] THE Belgian Ambassador to Tanzania, Mr. L. Jaspers has said his Government will continued to assist Tanzania in developing marine transport.

Speaking before handing over a certificate of ownership of a 20.2m/- tug, *MV Ukerewe*, to the Minister for Communications and Transport, Ndugu John Malecela, on Saturday, Mr. Jaspers expressed hope that with the creation of a special section for co-operation in his office, the volume of assistance would increase.

He said his Government was proud of having the privilege of developing passenger and cargo services in Tanzania's lakes.

Success in strengthening the transport sector was of vital importance not only for the socio-economic development of Tanzania but also for the economies of neighbouring land-locked countries, he said.

This factor of regional importance, the Ambassador said, was an incentive for friendly countries to help and assist Tanzania.

He said the commissioning of the tug was an incentive for further co-operation and assistance in Tanzania's development efforts, adding that Belgium had been following with sympathy and keen interest Tanzania's achievements in this field.

Mr Jaspers said though faced with tremendous economy problems, Belgium in the last two years had been increasing the volume of co-operation with Tanzania.

He said training of staff to man to the vessel was undertaken by the Belgian Government and that with the approval of the Tanzania Government, Belgium had added to the training programme courses in port management, harbour administration and harbour organisation techniques, benefiting the Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) and the Tanzania Harbours Authority (THA).

The tug was commissioned by Ndugu Malecela at a ceremony at Mwanza South Port.

Owned by TRC, the tug was built by Belgian Ship Company (BSC). It has a capacity of pulling six lighters of 150 tonnes each.

It is the fifth ship to be acquired by TRC with assistance from the Belgium Government. Others are *MV Mwongozo* and *Sangara* operating on Lake Tanganyika and *MV Butiama* and *Bukoba* on Lake Victoria.

Inviting the Minister to commission the boat, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of TRC, Ndugu Henry Limihagati, said *MV Ukerewe* would increase the Corporation's transport capacity and stir economic activities in the lake area. The tug would ply between Mwanza, Jinja, Musoma and Bukoba.

Ndugu Limihagati thanked the Belgium Government for technical and financial assistance amounting to 163,483,872/-.

He emphasized that Belgian assistance had helped TRC revamp its water transport network, easing the movements of crops, goods and people.

Ndugu Limihagati said a report on expansion of Lake Transport prepared by a professor from a Belgian University had been completed.

CSO: 3400/1581

FOUR SUGAR PLANTS TO RESUME PRODUCTION WITHIN WEEK

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 16 Jun 83 p 3

[Text] FOUR sugar factories in the country which closed down last September, would resume production in a week's time. They are Kilombero One, Kilombero Two, Kagera and Mtibwa.

Officials of the Kilombero sugar factory in Morogoro Region, and the Tanganyika Planting Company (TPC) in Kilimanjaro, told *Shihata* that they were completing preparations to begin sugar production.

At the Kilombero factory sugar processing would resume on June 20, and a TPC official said his plant would begin crushing sugar cane any time this week.

Last week the Kagera sugar factory announced that it would begin sugar processing this week. Efforts to contact Mtibwa sugar factory officials failed but it has been reliably learnt that the factory would resume work soon.

Three out of the four factories in the country were compelled to close down early last season because of heavy rains which made harvesting and movement of sugar difficult, according to the Ministry of Agriculture.

The affected factories were Kilombero One and Two, Kagera and Mtibwa. TPC continued production up to last month.

The SUDECO General Manager, Ndugu Reuben Naburi, said recently that the factories were projected to produce 128,000 tonnes of sugar this season compared to 111,800 tonnes yielded in the previous season.

According to Ndugu Naburi, Mtibwa was to produce 25,000 tonnes, Kagera 18,000, Kilombero 45,000 and TPC 40,000 tonnes.

Last season the factories produced 111,800 tonnes which was below the expected 135,000 tonnes.

The Ministry of Agriculture attributed the low production to early heavy rains which lowered the sucrose content of the cane.

The closure had an adverse effect on sugar consumers in the country. In Dar es Salaam city, for instance, sugar consumption dropped from 2,400 to 1,600 tonnes a month.

CSO: 3400/1581

MINISTER ANNOUNCES TRACTOR REPAIR PROGRAM

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 19 Jun 83 p 1

[Text] THE Government is drawing up an agricultural implements project under which an estimated 7,000 grounded tractors are to be repaired and used to boost agriculture in the country, the Minister for Industries, Ndugu Basil Mramba told Parliament yesterday.

There are an estimated 10,000 tractors in the country.

He was answering a supplementary question by Ndugu L.A. Semindu (Bagamoyo) who wanted to know why funds to construct a tractor factory at Kibaha were not forthcoming and instead feasibility studies were going on. "When will these studies be finalised so that the factory can serve the agricultural sector?", the MP asked.

Ndugu Semindu said that a country like Tanzania which was dependent on agriculture should obviously start setting up industries which would serve the sector.

"The problem we are facing in this country is that we have started with textile industries and others instead of industries to serve the agricultural sector", the MP observed.

The original question by the MP for Kibaha, Ndugu J.M. Kilewa sought to know when the Government would fulfil its promise to build a tractor factory at Kibaha.

The Deputy Minister for Industries, Ndugu Evarist Mwanansao had replied that the factory was to be built at Kibaha by Joint efforts of the State Motor Corporation (SMC) and a Finnish Firm, Valmet.

He said because of the importance of the project to the agricultural secor, Parliament had agreed not to omit it from the country's development programme as were other projects.

He said SMC, facing foreign exchange problems, had slowed the implementation of its projects. It was also taking measures to reduce costs of the project, to ensure peasants could buy the tractors.

CSO: 3400/1581

MINISTER FOR FINANCE PRESENTS BUDGET TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 17 Jun 83 p 1

[Article by Wence Mushi]

[Text] THE Government has raised sales tax on petrol and aviation kerosine, imposed a 100 per cent duty on gains from the reduced crude oil prices and a five per cent increase on telephone and power bills starting the next financial year.

It has also announced measures to ease the entry of pick-up vehicles, television sets and video tape recorders into the country, and reduced to 20 per cent sales tax on imported radios, the rate in use before January 1, this year.

The measures are contained in the 1983/84 budget estimates, presented to Parliament in Dar es Salaam yesterday by the Minister for Finance, Ndugu Cleopa Msuya.

The Minister said a one shilling sales tax has been imposed on a litre of petrol and 50 cents on a litre of aviation kerosine, effective next month. The 100 per cent duty on gains from lower world market prices of crude oil would go to the government coffers.

He said duty would be based on the prices paid for crude oil, gasolin and oil on entry, since the current retail prices were based on the then high oil prices.

The budget, elaborated to members of Parliament for just over one hour, contained no price increases on essential items, and Ndugu Msuya said was aimed at restoring internal balance between income and expenditure and lessen balance of payments pressures.

The Minister announced the scrapping of motor vehicle acquisition permit on pick-up vehicles weighing one tonne and above to encourage people to buy assets which can be used for productive purposes.

However, such vehicles should not have been in use for more than three years since manufacture, and that laid down import procedures should be observed when bringing them into the country, he said.

Ndugu Msuya said, however, sales tax on saloon cars had been doubled, but that on pickups would remain unchanged.

He also announced the lifting of restrictions on the bringing into the country of television (TV) sets and video tape recorders (VTR), provided taxes due on the items and annual licence fee of 1,000/- were paid to the Government.

He warned that the Government would seize and nationalise sets of those who failed to meet the stipulated conditions.

He also said effective July 1, this year, the Government would impose a five per cent surcharge on telephone and power bills.

Ndugu Msuya told Parliament that the budget aimed at rehabilitating the economy, and finally at balancing income and expenditure of foreign exchange.

He said starting next financial year, expenditure would be controlled more closely to ensure that every shilling yielded more output in terms of services than was the case presently.

For example, 50 per cent of funds allocated to office stationery and supplies would be withheld in the expectation that under the on-going war against racketeers and economic saboteurs, the items would be available at stipulated prices.

He added that 25 per cent of the funds for maintenance and the same amount of funds for printing would also be withheld in the same expectation that prices would be those stipulated.

He said self-reliance would be encouraged in a bid to reduce expenditure. He said in a bid to reduce costs, the recommendations of the Presidential Commission to reduce expenditure and raise efficiency would be taken into account.

He said one such recommendation was the freezing of employment for those posts not yet filed and for which no funds were allocated for the next financial year, except for doctors, teachers and agricultural extension officers.

He also said local governments would be expected, to a great extent, to be self reliant in collecting their own revenue to finance expenditures.

He said recurrent revenue are estimated at 11,265 million/- during the next financial year. Compared with the estimated expenditure of 15,620 million/-, there would be a deficit of 4,355 million/-, which would have to be covered through other revenue sources or borrowing from banks.

He said it was not possible to reduce expenditure below the estimates without affecting adversely essential services rendered to the people while at the same time, taxes could not be raised further, given the present difficult economic conditions.

To cover the gap, he said, the Ministry of Finance would now charge progressive capital gains tax instead of the former uniform tax of 20 per cent of gains, under the Income Tax Act of 1973, which is in for a review.

From now on, 20 per cent tax would be charged on profits of up to 100,000/- from sale of assets. Profits above 100,000/- but not more than 500,000/- would be charged 30 per cent, while any profits above 500,000/- would be charged 45 per cent.

He said a section would be added to the Act giving priority to the Commissioner of Income Tax to purchase interest in land at the price which the seller was first offered, to avoid cheating.

He also said withholding tax on management and professional fees, interest charges and other payments to external residents would be brought in line with those charged in neighbouring countries. He observed that those operating now were grossly low.

Fines and interest charges levied on those who violated procedures of filing tax figures would be also adjusted to reflect changed financial and other circumstances, Ndugu Msuya said. Those in use now were introduced in 1958, he observed.

He said these measures, coupled with the on-going campaign to net tax evaders, was expected to add collections of income tax by 500,000 million/-.

Ndugu Msuya said from the measures to streamline tax collection process, adjusting levels of taxes of certain items, the Government would raise some 735 million/-. However, a gap of 5,200 million/- would remain to be covered, between revenues and expenditures.

He said this amount would have to be secured through bank borrowing, but warned of the need of concerted efforts to reduce expenditure and raise incomes to blunt the effect of such heavy borrowing from the banking system.

Parliament has been adjourned until tomorrow to give time to the Members to study the Budget, whose total expenditure is estimated to be 21,450 million/-, while revenues are estimated at 16,250 million/-

CSO: 3400/1581

GOVERNMENT, UN, FAO, WFP SIGN REFUGEE VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 18 Jun 83 p 1

[Text] AGREEMENT on a plan of operation for the development of refugee villages in Kigoma was signed in Dar es Salaam yesterday between the Tanzania Government and the UN, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

Under the agreement, the WFP will supply to the refugees food valued at about 11.7 milion shillings for a period of three years on a "food-for-work" basis.

According to a press release issued by the United Nations Information Centre in Dar es Salaam, the refugees will receive a total of 1,335 tonnes of rice, 135 tonnes of pulses and 100 tonnes of vegetable oil.

The agreement was signed by the WFP Representative in Tanzania, Mr. D. Ouattara, and the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs, Ndugu H.R. Mohamed.

The food from the WFP will be provided as part-payment of wages for workers involved in land clearing for increased crop cultivation and tse-tse fly control.

The food will also be part-payment for reforestation, fish pond construction and communal infrastructural works in 22 priority villages in Kibondo, Kasulu and Kigoma districts where there are a concentration of spontaneously settled Burundi refugees.

A second component of the project will aim at increasing primary education facilities and to establish post-primary vocational training centres for refugees settled at Katumba, Ulyankulu and Mishamo.

The objective is to curtail drift of primary school leavers to urban areas by providing them with additional training, thus increasing their qualifications and employment opportunities locally.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Tanganyika Christian Refugees Service (TCRS) and the Tanzania Government also intend to budget, through 1985, towards the costs of the settlements some 117 million shillings which will cover water supply, roads, administration buildings, commercial centres, schools and dispensaries.

Currently, the WFP is involved in two other projects in which it has committed nearly 27.6 million shillings and in seven other development projects at a cost of nearly 408 million shillings.

CSO: 3400/1581

TAZARA TO START SECOND DAR ES SALAAM-MBEYA TRAIN SERVICE

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 17 Jun 83 p 3

[Text] The Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) is to introduce a second train service from Dar es Salaam to Mbeya towards the end of this month, the National Assembly was told in Dar es Salaam yesterday.

The Deputy Minister for Communications and Transport Ndugu Henry Limihagati, said the authority would continue to increase its services step by step as new engines arrived from West Germany.

Answering a question from Lt. Col. E. Mwakyambiki (Rungwe), Ndugu Limihagati said it was true that the number of trains on the line had been cut down from six to one, because of the problem of shortage of locomotives.

He said to run effectively, TAZARA required some 42 locomotives, but at present the authority was only using between 21 and 25 locomotives at any given one time. This, he said, was because the DFH imported from China had broken down.

Ndugu Limihagati said TAZARA had ordered some MTU engines for fitting into the DHF locomotives, and preliminary indications showed excellent performance. When all the locomotives have been fitted with new engines, normal services would resume.

Lt. Col. Mwakyambiki had questioned the rationale of cutting down services, and also the serious delays in train schedules. The deputy minister explained that because of the constant breakdowns, delays of departure and arrival times were inevitable.

CSO: 3400/1581

DANISH GOVERNMENT PROVIDES WATER PROJECTS GRANT

Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 14 Jun 83 p 1

[Text] The Danish Government has granted Tanzania about 270 million shillings in aid to finance implementation of water projects in Iringa, Mbeya and Ruvuma regions.

This will cover 2.7 million people in the regions who are to get potable water nearest to their homesteads within the next five years.

The Danish Charge d'Affaires in Tanzania, Ndugu Rubem Madsen, said in Dar es Salaam yesterday that the aid covers the years 1983-87 and will enable villagers have access to water sources within four kilometres.

Ndugu Madsen was presenting to the Minister for Water and Energy, Ndugu Al-Noor Kassum, completed water plans for the three regions. The report carries recommendations on water development sources in the three regions.

Implementation of the water projects is a continuation of the country's long-term programme to provide wholesome piped water to people's homes by the year 1990.

Already, seven million people are getting clean water in both the country's urban and rural areas. Other financiers of existing water projects include Finland, presently financing shallow well construction in Mtwara and Lindi regions.

Sweden is involved in the funding of the water projects in the Lake Zone.

By the year 1987 when implementation of the Danish-aided water projects in the three regions will have been completed, 10 million out of the 18 million Tanzanians will be getting clean tap water.

The report has recommended use of simple technology with about 67 percent of the 1,509 villages to be supplied by gravity system. The rest of the villages would get their water from shallow wells, it said.

Receiving the water plan, Ndugu Kassum said: "The master plans for the three regions--Iringa, Ruvuma and Mbeya--will be of tremendous help to the Government". He said the Government welcomed the master plans.

Ndugu Madsen said his Government was ever prepared to assist people, particularly in the rural areas.

But he pointed out that the success of the implementation programme of the three water master plans would depend on the participation of all the people in the areas concerned.

Tanzania and Denmark signed an agreement on the project in 1979 with the aim of drawing up a master plan for the three regions.

Implementation of the projects within the next ten years would require some two billion shillings, he said.

CSO: 3400/1581

BRIEFS

WHEAT YIELDS--Tanzania's average wheat yields per hectare have surpassed average yields on the grain staple in developing countries as a result of research on local production methods. The Tanzania Agricultural, Research Organisation (TARO) Director-General, Ndugu Jonas Kasembe, revealed this here on Tuesday while opening the second regional wheat workshop for East, Central and Southern Africa. Noting that the country's average yields of the cereal were presently above 2,000 kilogrammes per hectare, Ndugu Kasembe said the record was a result of research on production methods which preceded the management practices in operation. Comparatively, yields in developing countries ranged between 555kg and 3,885kg per hectare. [Anaclet Rwegayura] [Excerpt] [Dar es Salaam DAILY NEWS in English 17 Jun 83 p 3]

SELF-RELIANCE FUND--Ndugu Sokoine announced yesterday he was surrendering 50 per cent of his monthly salary beginning this month until 1985 when the present parliament ends its tenure of office as his contribution to the Presidential Fund for self-reliance. The Prime Minister told the House that his net income was 5,036/- per month. "This means my contribution towards the fund will be 2,518/65 every month", he said. [Excerpt] [Dar es Salaam SUNDAY NEWS in English 19 Jun 83 p 1]

CSO: 3400/1581

MUNGUL-DIAKA EXPLAINS WHY HE WILL ACCEPT AMNESTY, RETURN

Brussels LE SOIR in French 8 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by E. Ux.]

[Text] Although he has experienced what an associate has called "all the vicissitudes of Zairian politics," Mr Mungul-Diaka, a political refugee in Belgium since the spring of 1980, has accepted President Mobutu's offer of amnesty and has therefore decided to return to Zaire.

Mr Mungul-Diaka, former ambassador to Peking and Brussels, a former member of the National Legislative Council, former minister and former first secretary of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (the sole party), is familiar with Zairian prisons for various reasons.

Meeting with several journalists in May 1980, Mr Mungul-Diaka harshly denounced the policy of repression followed, according to him, for 15 years by Mobutu, who had "disrupted both the economic and political apparatus of Zaire."

He referred to the repression that was taking place, in particular, "in villages and working-class districts, where CND [National Documentation Center] (criminal investigation department) agents were seizing suspects and taking them to the Binza firing range or to the Ikafera concentration camp."

He said in 1980 that antiestablishment activities could lead to an uncontrollable and dangerous uprising for Western countries. He added that he preferred to oppose Mobutu in Zaire rather than abroad. He lashed out: "If there were free elections in Zaire, I would beat him hands down!"

During his extended stay in Belgium, Mr Mungul-Diaka established the "Council for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa," a movement which was quickly eclipsed after the arrival in Belgium of Mr Nguza Karl I. Bond, who in turn established the "Front," to which Mr Mungul-Diaka, losing the limelight, did not rally and entered into open competition with the former Zairian prime minister.

Mr Mungul-Diaka today circulated a communique in which he expressed his pleasure over the release of political prisoners and, more specifically, of the 13 members of the National Legislative Council. While condemning the arbitrariness of

those arrests, Mr Mungul-Diaka stated: "It is nevertheless true that this decision could create the conditions for a national reconciliation filled with hope for the Zairian people."

He also acknowledged that "many meetings have been held in Kinshasa between our associates and government representatives."

These meetings have resulted in a mixed delegation being sent to Brussels to smooth out certain difficulties. And he concluded: 'All these contacts and negotiations make it possible for us to announce that we have decided to return to Zaire to place ourselves directly at the disposal of the Zairian people, to share their problems, their anxieties and, perhaps, their future happiness."

And Mr Mungul-Diaka gave assurance that the Zairian people have renewed their confidence in him many times and that they call him the "bulldozer" or "Koda-Kombu," that is, "the one who dedicates himself to the general interest."

At present, Mr Mungul-Diaka is the only opponent who, at least officially, has responded positively to President Mobutu's offer of amnesty. Will others follow his example?

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CSO: 3419/988

FAO TEAM WORKING IN SOUTHERN PROVINCE TO IMPROVE FARM SKILLS

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 24 Jun 83 p 3

[Text]

A TEAM of experts from the Food and Agriculture Organisation has started work in Southern Province aimed at improving farming skills in the area, provincial permanent secretary, Mr Pencil Phiri said yesterday.

Mr Phiri said in Livingstone that the experts who started arriving last February would undertake long term projects involving the World Bank, FAO and the Zambian Government to enhance agriculture in the province.

The whole programme on which K25 million has been set aside will include improvements in livestock management, construction of dip tanks, tsetse control and other farm management techniques.

The experts will also look at ways of improving haulage of produce and storage while at the same time undertaking programmes to boost crop yields for small-scale and peasant farmers.

"This is a long term programme aimed at boosting agricutural production in the province and we hope that both small-scale and peasant farmers will gain a lot from the experience," he said.

The experts who include agricultural extention experts, economists, farm management specialists will be based in Choma while the administrative headquarters will be in Livingstone.

Mr Phiri said he would soon travel to Gwembe and Namwala to check progress at the two state farms.

CSO: 3400/1591

CRITICS OF SOUTHERN PROVINCE LEADERS 'BLIND TO REALITIES'

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 25 Jun 83 p 3

[Text]

CRITICS of the Party leadership in Southern Province will be proved wrong in the forthcoming Presidential and general elections because the electorate in the area has pledged to support President Kaunda.

Provincial Political Secretary, Mr Joseph Simuyandi said in Livingstone yesterday that people who were attacking the leadership were blind to the realities of the situation in the region.

Mr Simuyandi was speaking in his office when a nine-man Kitwe civic delegation led by councillor Sitwala Sifuba paid a courtesy call on him.

He told the visitors that people who were attacking the area's Member of the Central Committee, Mr Mungoni Liso on his vote ves strategy in the province were wrong.

"Critics who say that Liso is finished politically are blind to the situation because as the last former secretary general of the opposition, he is the right medium to change the thinking of the people here," he said.

Mr Simuyandi said that the leadership in the province would not tolerate village or pedestrian politics meant to divide the people for the sake of cheap popularity.

Mr Simuyandi and his counterpart Mr Wachuku Mwelwa would work hand in hand with Mr Liso who has accepted the challenge to change the voting pattern in the province for continued peace and progress.

He also told the councillors who included Kitwe District Executive Secretary, Mr Gilbert Zimba that Livingstone was a relatively peaceful town since Zimbabwe became free, three years ago.

Unlike the Copperbelt where crime had now reached alarming proportions, the PPS said, the tourist capital was a peaceful but busy area because it was essentially a rural area.

The Kitwe delegation which toured various development projects in Livingstone also visited Mazabuka and Choma district councils where Mr Zimba said the team learnt a lot and was well received.

CSO: 3400/1591

KAUNDA DENIES REPORTS NATION HARBORS UNITA ELEMENTS

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 27 Jun 83 p 1

[Excerpt]

PRESIDENT Kaunda has denied reports that Zambia harbours anti-Angolan government dissidents belonging to UNITA.

Speaking during an airborne Press conference from Lubumbashi, Zaire, where he attended a mini-summit with the Presidents of Angola and Zaire, President Kaunda said: "There is no shred of truth in these assertions. The truth is that we don't harbour any anti-Angolan government dissidents belonging to UNITA. We want to be honest and lead honest lives. . . We are not used to double dealings.

"We have always supported the MPLA. Evidence is there for anybody to see. . . and the situation has not changed," explained the President.

Recalling that MPLA forces fought from Zambia during their independence struggle against the Portuguese, President Kaunda said those spreading rumours on UNITA were enemies of the two countries.

CSO: 3400/1591

KAMANGA SAYS AFRICA NEEDS HELP OF 'FRIENDLY, PROGRESSIVE' NATIONS

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 25 Jun 83 p 5

[Text]

AFRICA still badly needs the support and help of friendly and progressive countries such as China to rid itself of the last vestiges of imperialism and racism, a member of the Central Committee said yesterday.

Chairman of the Political and Legal Sub-Committee Mr Reuben Kamanga said in Lusaka that although most countries on the continent were independent there still remained Namibia and South Africa suffering under the yoke of oppressive racist regimes.

Bidding farewell to a four-man delegation of Chinese youth leaders who left Zambia after a week-long visit, Mr Kamanga said a few years ago it was thought the Namibian issue had been resolved.

"But we still had to go back to the United Nations over the same problem which is still with us, all because of capitalism, colonialism, racism and imperialism."

Africa realised the struggle to liberate Southern Africa from such evils was going to be tough.

"But with goodwill and assistance from countries like China to the liberation movement we shall crack that nut and see light in the rest of Southern Africa," Mr Kamanga said.

China had helped and still continued to assist Zambia in various fields of human endeavour.

Mr Kamanga who took a break from a current Central Committee meeting in order to meet the Chinese delegation at his office, described the relations between Zambia and China as "very friendly".

And leader of the Chinese delegation Mr He Guangwe who is vice-chairman of the All-China Youth Federation said his team had enjoyed the warm reception accorded it in Zambia.

During their stay, which took them to Kabwe and the Copperbelt they had learnt a lot about youth activities in this country.

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FARM WORKERS' WIVES STAGE DEMONSTRATION

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 25 Jun 83 p 2

[Text]

ABOUT 70 wives of workers of Nchanga Farms in Chililabombwe staged a demonstration outside offices of the farm manager, Mr Andy Torrance to protest against the decision to stop their husbands from getting mealie meal on credit.

Mr Torrance confirmed the protest but was reluctant to discuss the incident. "It is an internal problem and it has nothing to do with the Press. In fact the matter has been sorted out."

The women gathered at the manager's office yesterday morning demanding to be told why the company had taken such a move.

They complained the system of getting mealie meal on credit had been going on for many years and had been of great benefit to their families.

The women picketed outside the manager's office for about an hour until Mr Torrance assured them their husbands would continue to receive the commodity on credit.

District labour officer, Mr George Mwale said the situation at the farm had returned to normal and all the women who staged the protest had dispersed.

He said the workers were expected to start receiving the mealie meal on credit today. — Zana.

CSO: 3400/1591

M'PASSOU WARNS CHURCH AGAINST ASSUMING OPPOSITION PARTY ROLE

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 27 Jul 83 p 7

[Text]

THE church has been warned against assuming the role of an opposition party in Zambia.

A senior official at the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation Dr Dennis M'passou sounded the warning at the weekend in an address to the provincial Women's League conference held in Kitwe.

He said when there was only one party as was the case in Zambia, the church should not set itself against the Party and its Government.

"The temptation to do so is very great especially when the church can often say things under the guise of carrying out its prophetic voice," he said in a paper titled 'the church and politics'.

"The development of our society depends on good government, good political leadership and a church which sits on the fence and watches things go wrong politically without raising its voice has ceased to be a church," he said.

The political struggle which "kicked out the imperialists" and ushered in the present Government was a struggle for justice, equality and dignity.

On whether the church should participate in politics Dr M'passou said one should realise that the only political party which resisted the participation of the church in its political activities would be a corrupt and dishonest party, one that was afraid of criticism.

"On the church's side, one would say that the only church which would be saying that its members should not participate in politics would be that church which has ceased to take its master seriously."

In a country such as Zambia where there was only one party, there could be no real danger of the church getting too close to the party as to be divisive.

"When a church leader says vote 'Yes' for President Kaunda he is not siding with Kaunda against anybody, he is only approving the good leadership of President Kaunda.

Reconcilliation

"But he is also doing more than that. He is in effect saying let us protect peace, freedom, honesty, unity, prosperity and reconcilliation."

The church could not afford to be neutral because neautrality often meant saying nothing whether things were good or bad.

On the supremacy of the Party, he said the church accepted this but it understood that supremacy to be within the philosophy of Humanism, which implied the supremacy of man, which fitted in the biblical concept of man.

The Party could only be supreme above things it created. "But the Party could not be supreme over the divine mission of the church and the church should be thankful that the Party realises this, and that is why the freedom of worship is enjoyed."

CSO: 3400/1591

CHITAMBALA RAPS ZNUT OFFICIALS' 'NEGATIVE' SECURITY VIEWS

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 27 Jun 83 p 7

[Text]

COPPERBELT Provincial political secretary Mr Pickson Chitambala has joined the debate on whether Zambia was enjoying peace and has attacked Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) deputy general secretary Mr John Mulenga for his "negative view of the security situation."

Mr Chitambala said in Ndola yesterday Zambia was enjoying peace and she could not be compared with other African countries where there was internal strife.

Closing the Copperbelt province women's League Conference in Kitwe Mr Chitambala wondered why Mr Mulenga made such a charge.

Zambia, he said, was stable because of the leadership of President Kaunda and there was need to retain him in the next presidential and general elections.

Mr Mulenga clashed with Chiwala Member of Parliament Mr Eno Juma Banda at the weekend when he said there was no peace in Zambia because criminals had "virtually taken over the country." Mr Banda said Zambia was enjoying peace and stability because of the wise leadership of President Kaunda.

But Mr Mulenga argued saying: "What do you mean by peace and security when criminals have taken over the running of the country and people are being butchered day and night? When we vote for President Kaunda it will be for his qualities but peace is certainly not with us."

Mr Chitambala urged the women not to listen to people like Mr Mulenga. He appealed to them to mobilise eligible voters to retain President Kaunda with a massive "Yes" vote.

Zambia had won respect in Africa and the world over because of President Kaunda who had tirelessly worked hard for Zambia to be recognised internationally.

CSO: 3400/1591

ZCCM CLOSES MECHANIC TRAINING SCHOOLS IN COST CUTTING PROGRAM

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 24 Jun 83 p 1

[Text]

ZAMBIA Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) has closed down seven mechanic training schools in its continued cost cutting and rationalisation programme.

The closed schools are at Konkola in Chililabombwe, Kalulushi, Chambishi, Luanshya, Mufulira west, Copperbelt Power Company (CPC) in Kitwe and Nchanga Open Pit at Chingola.

A spokesman said in a statement released in Ndola yesterday ZCCM had improved other four existing industry training centres which would be the best equipped in Zambia.

The exercise had led to a considerable reduction in expatriate staff, some of whom had already left at the end of their contracts. Others are in the process of leaving while some would be transferred to help man the new centres.

The improved engineering training centres to be known as trades schools have been set up at Nchanga ... Chingola, Mufulira, Kitwe and Luanshya.

Originally the mining industry had ten mechanic schools catering for the former Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM) divisions.

The Nchanga and Mufulira centres will run mechanics and technicians courses with specialised courses for machinists at Mufulira and craft training at Kitwe and Luanshya.

CSO: 3400/1591

DBZ DIRECTOR CLARIFIES BANK'S LENDING POLICY

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 27 Jun 83 p 4

[Text]

THE responsibility of financing small-scale industries in Zambia is jointly shared by all commercial banks and the Development Bank of Zambia (DBZ) has wondered why entrepreneurs were only asking for this bank's assistance.

Clarifying the bank's lending policy in Lusaka at the weekend, managing director Mr Lumbamba Nyambe noted that some people had a misconception that the bank was a Government institution which was compelled to assist.

"It's quite expensive for DBZ or any development bank in the world to administer small-scale programmes because unlike commercial banks, we do not have branch networks."

The Government only had 45 per cent shares in DBZ while international private firms and Zambian parastatal companies hold 40 and 15 per cent shares respectively. The bank's total resources stood at K105 million and out of the total, the Government had only invested K5.5 million, said Mr Nyambe.

"People are expecting too much from us because they believe that the institution belongs to the Government. But while we accept that the Government has provided assistance to us, the money we are using is borrowed from outside."

Conceding that the bank's lending regulations to small-scale industries were stringent because of high risk factors, Mr Nyambe said following the amendment of the DBZ Act the bank had lowered its minimum lending from K25,000 to K5,000.

"Our regulations are stringent because we are a medium to long-term institution, therefore we have to go into thorough long-term appraisal."

Brushing aside charges of red tape levelled at his bank Mr Nyambe said all loans were approved by the board of directors who met quarterly.

"The question of red tape is out because directors have to travel long distances from abroad to attend these meetings."

But under a scheme to finance small-scale industries just about to be launched the bank's management committee had been empowered to sanction loans of up to K50,000 while the board would handle applications exceeding the amount.

Reacting to remarks by vice-chairman of the Small-Scale Industries Association Mr Rich Namala who last week urged the bank to clarify its lending policy to his members, Mr Nyambe said following the amendment to the DBZ Act last December his bank was now "in a position to assist entrepreneurs "irrespective of any minimum lending limit".

CSO: 3400/1591

MONEY CROP COTTON NEED NOT HARM FOOD PRODUCTION

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAIN in French 27 Jun 83 pp 13-16

[Article by Joseph Kahoun: "Cotton: an Important Source of Exchange"]

[Text] The producer's price of cotton is increasing for the 1983-1984 season. It will rise from 62 to 70 francs per kilogram for first grade, and from 45 to 50 francs for second and third grade.

This announcement, made at the beginning of March, warmed the hearts of the producers. As a result of it, cotton output may increase in the coming year. If the rain does not play tricks.

In the meanwhile, CARREFOUR AFRICAIN will try to review what has been done, or is being done, in this economic sector. Cotton-growing in Upper Volta, for export, as we know, is not a recent development. It was introduced during the colonial period, and at the time was not warmly welcomed.

Today, the situation has changed, including the attitudes. Cotton has become the main source of income in some Voltan areas. Many farmers cannot envisage any other agricultural product that could earn them so much.

It thus provides the welfare for many families. But it also poses some problems.

In 1982, more than 3 billion CFA francs (precisely 3,503,456,929) was pumped into the rural environment by cotton-growing, a total production of 57,534 tons. This year, the rural environment received about 4.6 billion CFA francs from cotton sales. These are substantial sums of money.

Certainly, cotton-growing, more than any other crop, is very arduous: week after week of work, sowing, manuring, and weeding. Days and days in the intolerable smell of insecticides. Then, weeks and weeks of harvesting under a boiling sun.

What a lot of effort.

However, it is wrong to think that all farmers involved with cotton are always complaining. That they are not is probably because the rural philosophy is based in general on the view that "you must earn your bread by the sweat of your brow," and probably also because the same philosophy also often causes them to minimize the effort contributed in relation to the profit returned.

However, the facts, despite its recognized hardships, many persist in cotton-growing above all because this activity enables them to achieve many things: build a permanent house, or construct a school, dispensary or maternity home for the village. In short, achievements that would never be possible without sufficient money coming in.

Eighteen Billion in 10 Years

Cotton-growing is particularly developed in the rural development organizations (ORD) of Volta Noire (Dedougou) and Haut-Bassins (Bobo-Dioulasso). Indeed, out of 3.5 billion paid to producers in 1982, almost 3 billion went to these two ORD's. The other regions shared the remaining 500 million.

This demonstrates that cotton-growing has not been accepted throughout Upper Volta with the same enthusiasm. For obvious reasons, Yatenga ORD and Sahel ORD are not on the Upper Volta cotton map. The rainfall prohibits it. However, you will also notice that some areas that do receive good rain only grow a little cotton. This is the case with Comoe (Banfora) and Bougouriba (Diebougou) ORD's.

It would thus be hasty to conclude, as a very widespread view implies, that cotton-growing uses the country's best land, to the detriment of food crops.

One thing that can no longer be denied, even without being a cotton enthusiast, is that the product currently occupies a key position in our economy.

In the production areas cotton is the farmers' main source of stable income. From 1970 to 1980 cotton earned for its producers a total of 18 billion francs, or an average of 1.8 billion per year.

In 1979 to 1980, the average earning per producer was 100,000 francs in the Solenzo area.

On the other hand, cotton has become the country's principal source of export and currency earnings. Since 1980 it has exceeded animal husbandry products, as these figures provided by the Voltan Textile Fibers Company (SOFITEX) show:

Development of Export Earnings

(in billion CFA francs)

Year	Total Exports	Cotton	Animals-meat
1978	9.6	3	4.1
1979	16.2	5.7	5.2
1980	19	8.7	5.4
1981	19.9	9.1	

It is worth pointing out that the country's single textile factory fulfills all its raw material need with local cotton. This represents a turnover of more than 500 million that stays within the country.

Likewise, the Bobo-Dioulasso oil and soap factory processes mainly cotton seed for an annual production varying between 3,000 and 4,000 tons of oil, or more than half the national need. Also, the export of cotton oilcake by that factory is estimated to be worth more than 300 million francs.

It is thus undeniable that cotton is an important source of foreign exchange for our country. To neglect cotton-growing would mean taking a step backward. [Map showing distribution of harvesting omitted]

A few years ago, a subprefect in a village told this anecdote to remind farmers that cotton-growing should not cause them to forget food crops. He said that one day a farmer who had grown only cotton came back from a walk and asked his wife to bring him the meal. The latter, who had not been able to put the pot on the fire because she didn't have any food, washed a plate that she then filled with cotton. She put a cover on it and brought it to her husband. When he took off the cover to find out what he has being served, he broke into a rage, jumped at his wife and began to beat her. The good lady began to cry as she said: "You have grown only cotton yet you want something else to eat. Kill me if you wish, but I will not go and beg in order to feed you."

However, though this anecdote may not have really happened, at certain times it has been close to reality for some farmers.

We have seen farmers neglect grain crops in favor of cotton to the point of having to go and buy food like office workers. The slump in grain sales or its very low price resulted in farmers cutting back voluntarily the area planted with grain in cotton areas. Thus, all it took was a poor rainy season for food production to no longer meet family needs over a long period.

Our Corn Became Worm-Eaten

The situation today takes a different form. After suffering from food shortage during the drought of 1973-1974, the farmers became prudent and provident. They tried to achieve a balance between cotton and grain. Thus, today it is evident that the Voltan cotton areas are also the ones that are producing the

most grain. The Volta Noire ORD is proposing to supply this year to the National Grain Office (OFNACER) 15,000 tons, or half the total volume that OFNACER expects to buy from the Voltan farmers. This ORD produced 200,000 tons of grain in 1982, compared to 178,000 in 1981.

Apparently, this increase can be explained by the fact that OFNACER is interested in buying local grain at quite a high price: 58 francs per kilogram; considerably higher than merchants are offering.

However, the problem is that OFNACER is unable to buy all the grain that it is offered. One group of farmers we met recently said they were prepared to grow only food, but on condition that they can sell it well. They added: "Last year, the village group established a grain pool. However, there were no buyers, and our grain became worm-eaten. At least with cotton you are sure of selling all of it." The leaders of another village group explained that thanks to the earnings from their self-managed cotton marketing, they were able to start several projects. "If we ever had to cut back our cotton production we would have to resort to collecting money in order to finish the projects already started. Yet if we requested payments from the people, they would respond unwillingly. They would say that it was a second tax." Thus, the reality today is that the farmer needs more than food. He also needs money to take care of himself, buy clothes, pay his taxes, and buy spare parts for his bicycle. If fate is such that where he lives he can get this money by growing either cotton or maize, obviously he will have a preference for one or the other.

It would not be really accurate today to say that cotton decreases food supply. For example, when you compare the area under cotton with the area under grain, the latter is far greater.

What should be done, therefore, is perhaps to try to improve the per-hectare yield of grain, and also to try to grow varieties with good drought-resistance and short growing season.

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TWO CONCERNS FOR COTTON FARMER: FERTILIZER COST, INSECTICIDE DANGER

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAIN in French 27 Jun 83 p 16

[Text] Even though heavily subsidized, fertilizer is still expensive. A kilogram of fertilizer costs the farmer 62 francs. If it were not subsidized, it would cost him 120 francs. A kilogram of fertilizer thus costs as much as a kilogram of cotton, though fortunately you can produce more than a kilogram of cotton with a kilogram of fertilizer. Nevertheless, the steady increase in the cost of that factor is a principle worry of the farmer.

When you glance at the statistics for the last 10 years put out by the Voltan Textile Fibers Company (SOFITEX), you observe that the price of fertilizer has never stayed the same from one year to the next.

In 1972-73 a ton of fertilizer cost an average of 41,200 francs. In 1973-1974 this average had increased to more than 49,000 francs. Then, in 1975-1976, the price doubled. At Bobo, for example, it increased from 57,904 to 136,491 francs. This huge increase was explained by the surge in the price of oil following the Yom Kippur war in October 1973.

However, that year was indeed exceptional, because in the following year the price fell again, to resume an ascending curve that has continued to the present.

As for insecticides, it is not so much the cost that causes concern as the danger they represent.

When you study the composition of the insecticides used in treatment of cotton in Upper Volta, you learn that they contain a high proportion of DDT. A colleague publication, LE CRDI EXPLORE, recently pointed out that DDT has been banned in most of the industrialized countries because the soil and water retain significant quantities of it after its application, and concentrations show up in the food chain, ending up in the fatty tissue of humans. Samuel Gitonga, a Kenyan engineer who is director of the Kenyan National Irrigation Office, confirms this, explaining that "the banning of DDT in the industrialized countries had repercussions on the less-developed countries. The product suddenly became more available and less expensive... It thus became much more competitive than other pesticides whose use was less dangerous."

We should thus pay close attention to these poisons that we import, and avoid the more harmful ones as far as possible. We know that the farmer no longer hestitates to dust even food plants (beans, peanuts) with these products not intended for that purpose. the SOFITEX officials are well aware of this problem. Fulgence Toe said: "This product is very effective against cotton parasites. However, with the appearance of new products that are just as effective and less toxic, it would be wrong to continue to use DDT, even though it is cheaper." He added that SOFITEX began 3 years ago reducing its orders for products containing DDT. He gave assurance that this year no product containing DDT was ordered.

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